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rules in their respective countries. Providing a comparative look at this important area,
this Article examines the applicable practices and procedures in the common law na-
tions of Australia, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand, and the United States.
I. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS
A. Must warnings be given when law enforcement officers interrogate? Under
what circumstances? What is the substance of those warnings?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
Australia consists of nine jurisdictions in a federal constitutional system, being
the Commonwealth of Australia, six states, and two territories that have been granted
a limited right of self-government by the federal government.1 Commonwealth law
applies in all states and territories alongside the laws made by the legislatures of
those jurisdictions, and federal law enforcement agencies operate within each of the
states and territories separately from, but at times in conjunction with, the state and
territory police forces and other investigative agencies.2 In each jurisdiction, the
criminal law, including the law of criminal procedure and the law of evidence as it
affects criminal proceedings, is largely set out in legislation enacted by the government
of that jurisdiction, augmented by the common law.
In general terms, law enforcement officers in all Australian jurisdictions are ob-
liged by legislation to afford arrested suspects (i.e., persons they reasonably suspect
to have been involved in the commission of an offence) a number of rights before
they question them in respect of the matter under investigation.3 One such right is
a caution to the effect, generally, that the suspect is not obliged to answer questions,
and that anything they say or do during the course of an interview may be used in
1 In order of the most populous to the least, the states and territories are: New South
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital
Territory, and Northern Territory. There are other territories, including external territories, but
they do not have separate legislatures and statutory frameworks.
2 The Australian Legal System, AUSTL.NAT’LUNIV., https://libguides.anu.edu.au/c.php
?g=634887&p=4547083 [https://perma.cc/ET28-8TZX] (last visited May 6, 2021).
3 See, e.g., Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3, 3V–3ZQ (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 139
(Austl.); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) ss 114–131 (Austl.);
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 139 (Austl.); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464A-464J (Austl.); Police
Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 391, 396–441 (Austl.); Criminal Investigation
Act 2006 (WA) ss 136–143 (Austl.); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79A (Austl.); Bail
Act 1985 (SA) s 13 (Austl.); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 139 (Austl.); Crimes Act 2000 (ACT)
s 222 (Austl.); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 139 (Austl.); Criminal Law (Detention and Inter-
rogation) Act 1995 (Tas) ss 4–6, 9 (Austl.); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) ss 127, 135,
140 (Austl.). The New South Wales, ACT, and Tasmanian provisions mirror the Commonwealth
provisions. I note also that, despite the title of the South Australian statute, it contains the law
concerning the arrest and interviewing of suspects for indictable offences (which are gen-
erally tried before juries).
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evidence in a court of law.4 Across the jurisdictions there are different formulations
of the caution, but flexibility is allowed in respect of the wording to ensure that a
suspect understands the substance of the caution. The caution may be given on more
than one occasion in an officer’s dealings with a suspect, which will usually culmi-
nate in a videorecorded interview. Further, in two jurisdictions the content of the
caution is not set out in the statute and must be discerned from other sources.5
Before the enactment of statutory provisions stipulating the rights of suspects
and the obligations of law enforcement officers in respect of questioning (or interro-
gation) of suspects, there was no requirement at common law for a law enforcement
officer to caution a suspect in respect of his or her right to remain silent and the use
that could be made of anything said by the suspect.6 The common law principles
governing the admissibility or discretionary exclusion of confessions (or, more broadly,
admissions relevant to the commission of the offence)7 made by accused persons did
not create such an obligation, but, over time, they provided the context for the po-
tential consequences of a failure to caution. The principles, which continue to apply,
consist of two “definite”8 rules that predicate the admissibility of evidence of a
confession upon the confession being “voluntary,” and three discretionary bases for
the exclusion of such evidence even if it is found to have been voluntary.9 The dis-
cretionary bases were summarised by Gleeson CJ in Tofilau v The Queen:
The first is a case where it would be unfair to the accused to admit
the statement. The relevant form of unfairness is related to the
law’s protection of the rights and privileges of the accused person.
The second is a case where considerations of public policy, such
as considerations that might be enlivened by improper police
4 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23F; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 139; Law Enforcement (Powers
and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 122; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 139; Crimes Act
1958 (Vic) s 464A(3); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 431(1); Criminal
Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 138; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79A(3); Evidence Act
2011 (ACT) s 139; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 139; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 140.
5 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 431(1) (referring to an obligation
to caution the person “in the way required under the responsibilities code”); Criminal In-
vestigation Act 2006 (WA) s 138 (referring simply to an arrested suspect’s entitlement “to be
cautioned before being interviewed as a suspect”). For the content of the caution in Western
Australia, see infra text accompanying note 20.
6 Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138, 141 (Austl.).
7 Henceforth I will use “confession” to encompass also relevant admissions that are not
explicitly a confession of the offence.
8 Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396, 408 (Austl.). Although the meaning of
“definite” in this context is debatable (as appears from the judgments in Tofilau), it would appear
to denote that the rules do not involve the exercise of a discretion; rather, a finding that a con-
fession was not voluntary will necessarily result in exclusion of the confession from the
evidence at trial.
9 231 CLR at 401–02, 408, 411, 416, 418–19, 422–23, 468–70.
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conduct, make it unacceptable to admit the statement. The third
concerns the general power of a trial court to reject evidence on
the ground that its prejudicial effect (that is to say, the danger of its
misuse, not its inculpatory force) outweighs its probative value.10
I will refer to the common law principles in more detail below in the context of what
would be an improper interrogation.
In England, in the absence of a common law requirement for a caution to be
given, the judges of the King’s Bench Division promulgated the Judges’ Rules for
the guidance of police officers in relation to obtaining evidence, especially confes-
sional evidence, and those rules included a requirement that “[a]s soon as a police
officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
person has committed an offence,” the officer was required to caution the suspect
that they were not obliged to say anything unless they wished to do so, but what they
said would be put into writing and given in evidence.11 Aspects of the Judges’ Rules,
including the requirement for a caution, were adopted in Australia in practices and
standing orders implemented by the various commissioners of police, and continue
to apply in updated forms.12 However, the Judges’ Rules have never been law in
Australia, although they have been recognised as useful guides to the propriety of
police conduct for the purpose of considering the exercise of the discretion to
exclude confessional statements.13 Commissioners’ circulars and standing orders have
been regarded in the same way,14 although some orders may fall into the category
of subsidiary legislation, breach of which will mean the police conduct was unlawful
and would engage the public policy head of discretionary exclusion.15
The rights of arrested suspects and the obligations of police officers in respect
of them are now largely governed by legislation.16 There are differences between the
jurisdictions, although there are also common threads. A detailed comparison is
beyond the scope of this contribution. As I am a judge in Western Australia, I will
focus generally on the legislation in this State.
In general terms, the statutory provisions identify the rights of an arrested suspect
and impose obligations on investigating officers to enable the suspect to exercise those
10 Id. at 402; see also R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 189 (Austl.); Cleland v The
Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1, 5, 9 (Austl.).
11 Harling v Hall (1997) 94 A Crim R 437, 439 (Austl.) (quoting Practice Note (Judges’
Rules) [1964] 1 WLR 152 (Eng.)).
12 For the situation in Western Australia, see Norton v The Queen [2001] WASCA 207
(19 July 2001) 46–49 (Austl.).
13 R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133, 142–43 (Austl.); Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82
ALR 10, 15–16 (Mason CJ) (Austl.); Harling, 94 A Crim R at 439–40.
14 R v Collins (1979) 4 NTR 1, 28 (Gallop J) (Austl.); Norton, [2001] WASCA 207 at 60, 64.
15 Norton, [2001] WASCA 207 at 64.
16 In relation to the need for a caution when interviewing suspects, see for example Crimes
Act 1914 (Cth) s 23F (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 139 (Austl.).
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rights. The obligations take two forms: the provision of information and the facilita-
tion of the suspect’s rights.
In Western Australia, the obligation to caution the suspect arises by way of the
need to afford the suspect his or her right to be cautioned before being interviewed.17
What it means to be “cautioned” is not defined in the statute.18 In that regard, the
provisions of the Criminal Investigations Act (CIA) differ from similar provisions
in other jurisdictions, most of which stipulate the terms of the caution.19
In Western Australia, the statute has been construed on the basis that it was
enacted in the knowledge of the long-established practice of a caution being given
to arrested suspects in this State in accordance with the Commissioner’s Orders and
Procedures Manual (COP’s Manual), which currently provides relevantly:
When a police officer administers a caution the words used
should be similar to:
‘You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so,
but whatever you do say will be recorded and may later be given
in evidence.’
The exact words used may vary. In the case of children or others
who may have difficulty comprehending the caution it may be
necessary to break it down. What is critical is that a police officer
conveys it to the suspect and is satisfied that they understand:
• They are free to speak or be silent or that they do not have
to answer questions (addresses voluntariness)
• Whatever they say will be recorded (addresses fairness)
• What they say may be communicated to a court in evidence
(addresses fairness).20
In practice, particularly during videorecorded interviews, the caution will be
elaborated upon by reference to the presence of the cameras and microphones and
the fact that the interview will be recorded on video, and by the use of words similar
to the caution in the Commonwealth Crimes Act, which refers to what the suspect
may do, as well as what they may say.21 Further, although it is not mandated by the
CIA or the COP’s Manual, it is almost invariably the practice that the interviewer
will ask the suspect to repeat the caution back in their own words to indicate their
understanding. As evidence that it is ingrained in training, that approach is taken
17 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) ss 137(3), 138(2) (Austl.).
18 See id. s 138(2).
19 See sources cited supra note 4.
20 W. AUSTL.POLICEFORCE,POLICEMANUAL,at s QS-01.02.3 (2020); see Wright v Western
Australia [2010] WASCA 14 (29 January 2010) 3–4 (Austl.).
21 The need for a video recording arises by virtue of Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA)
s 118, which I will discuss later.
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irrespective of the suspect’s level of sophistication or legal knowledge. If breaks are
taken during the course of an interview, the suspect will be reminded of the caution
upon recommencement. There will sometimes also be reminders of the caution when
the suspect is asked to do something specific during the interview, such as making
a drawing or signing a photograph shown to him or her.
In Western Australia, the obligations to which I have referred, including the
giving of a caution, are not confined to police officers, but apply also to a “public
officer,” as defined in the CIA, and to “any person who holds an office with powers
to arrest people.”22 The statutes in other jurisdictions refer to “police officer,” “in-
vestigating official,” and “investigating member” (of the police).23 In all jurisdictions
except Queensland, the provisions relate to persons who are in custody, having been
arrested. In order to have arrested the suspect, the investigating officer must have
reasonably suspected that the person had committed, was committing, or was about
to commit an offence.24 A reasonable suspicion is a state of mind, based on known
facts, that is more than speculation but less than belief that the suspect is probably
guilty of the offence.25 The Queensland legislation refers to a “relevant person”
being a person who “is in the company of a police officer for the purpose of being
questioned as a suspect about his or her involvement in the commission of an
indictable offence.”26 The Crimes Act refers to a person who is under arrest and “a
protected suspect,”27 being a person who has not been arrested, but
is in the company of an investigating official for the purpose of
being questioned about a Commonwealth offence . . . [and in re-
spect of whom] the official believes that there is sufficient evi-
dence to establish that the person has committed the offence . . .
[or] the official would not allow the person to leave if the person
wished to do so . . . [or] the official has given the person reason-
able grounds for believing that the person would not be allowed
to leave if he or she wished to do so . . . .28
It will be apparent that the statutory provisions in the Commonwealth jurisdic-
tion (which are mirrored in New South Wales and Tasmania) and in Queensland are
22 Id. s 138(1) (“Public officer” is defined in section 3 to mean “a person, other than a police
officer, appointed under a written law to an office that is prescribed under section 9(1)” of
the CIA.).
23 See, e.g., Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464(3), 464C(1) (Austl.); Crimes Act 2000 (ACT)
s 212(a) (Austl.); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 140 (Austl.).
24 See, e.g., Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 128.
25 See Lai v The Queen [2003] NTCCA 12 (14 November 2003) 9 (Austl.).
26 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 415(1) (Austl.).
27 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23B(1), 23B(2) (Austl.).
28 Id. s 23B(2).
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engaged even if the person who is in the company of the police is not under arrest.
What is the situation in Western Australia if the police interview a person who they
have not arrested, but suspect of having committed the offence? Such a situation may
arise where a person attends the station voluntarily at the request of the police, or
where the suspect is already in custody as a sentenced prisoner. In the first instance, it
would be expected—if the police had a reasonable suspicion—that the person would
be arrested for the purposes of the interview so that he could be afforded his rights
under sections 137 and 138 of the Criminal Investigation Act.29 If that did not occur,
the common law principles would apply, as they would in the case of the sentenced
prisoner. A failure to inform the suspect of the offence for which he or she was being
investigated, or to caution the suspect, would be relevant factors in determining
whether any confession should be excluded in the exercise of discretion if objection
were taken.30
Finally, it should be noted that there are a number of statutory powers conferred
on investigating agencies by which persons who are believed to have relevant in-
formation may be compelled to provide that information. Examples can be found in
proceeds of crime legislation and the powers conferred on anti-corruption agencies.
They also include powers enabling police investigators to compel a suspect to unlock
a password protected electronic device (or provide information for that purpose).
There are checks and balances in such laws for the proper exercise of those powers. In
the case of compulsory examinations, there will ordinarily be a prohibition on the
use of evidence so obtained in criminal proceedings (other than for perjury) against the
person who has given the evidence.31 Section 23F(3) of the Crimes Act specifically
excludes the requirement for a caution “so far as another law of the Commonwealth
requires the person to answer questions put by, or do things required by, the investi-
gating official.”32 On the other hand, it will be a requirement of procedural fairness
that persons who are compelled to answer questions or provide information by other
means under statutory provisions must be warned of the consequences of failing to
do so, which may include prosecution for contempt.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
The admissibility of statements is governed by two distinct, yet related, sources
of Canadian law: the common law confessions rule and the constitutional rules set
by section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.33
29 See Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) ss 137, 138.
30 As to whether the person ought to be regarded as a suspect, see Western Australia v
Gibson [2014] WASC 240 (4 July 2014) 16–17 (Austl.).
31 See, e.g., Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) s 145(1) (Austl.).
32 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23F(3).
33 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 10, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
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Dealing first with the common law, the “confessions rule” applies to any state-
ment made by an individual to a person in authority.34 The prosecution must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that such a statement was voluntary as a precondition
to admission.35 A voir dire into voluntariness must be held at trial unless the accused
has provided a clear, express, and unequivocal waiver.36
Voluntariness may be vitiated by threats, inducements, promises, oppressive
conditions, police trickery, or other circumstances that unfairly deny the suspect the
right to choose whether to speak to state authorities.37 It is not enough to show that
there was a promise or threat or other wrongdoing. There must be a link between the
impugned state conduct and the statement. It must be established that the suspect
chose to speak because of the promise or threat or inducement and that his or her
will was overborne.38 Voluntariness will also be vitiated if the suspect demonstrates
that he or she did not have an “operating mind” at the time of the statement,39 though
the threshold for an operating mind is very low.
Police in Canada abide by the “Judges’ Rules” originally developed in England,40
which require that a primary and, in some cases, a secondary caution be given to a
suspect. The primary caution reads:
[I wish to give you the following warning:] You need not say any-
thing. You have nothing to hope from any promise or favour,
nothing to fear from any threat, whether or not you say anything.
Anything you do say may be used as evidence . . . Do you un-
derstand?41
The secondary caution is given where the suspect has already made a statement:
I wish to give you the following warning: You must clearly
understand that anything said to you previously should not
influence you or make you feel compelled to say anything at this
time. Whatever you felt influenced or compelled to say earlier
34 R v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 460–62 (Can.).
35 Id. at 460.
36 Id. at 454.
37 R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 para. 68, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 42 (Can.).
38 See id. paras. 15, 33; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 para. 13, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, 508
(Can.).
39 Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 462.
40 See, e.g., Clarkson v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 399 (Can.).
41 R. v. Latimer, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, 225 (Can.); see SIMONVERDUN-JONES &ADAMIRA
TIJERINO, A REVIEW OF BRYDGES DUTY COUNSEL SERVICES IN CANADA 33, https://www.jus
tice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr03_la4-rr03_aj4/rr03_la4.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3A4
-L3LS] (last visited May 6, 2021).
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you are now not obliged to repeat nor are you obliged to say
anything further but whatever you do say may be given in evi-
dence. Do you understand . . . ?42
These warnings are usually given after the Charter caution, which I will turn to
next.
Sections 10(a) and (b) of the Charter provide as follows:
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be in-
formed of that right.43
Unlike the confessions rule which applies to any statement given to a person in
authority, section 10 applies only if a person is arrested or detained for constitutional
purposes.44 Detention may be physical or psychological in nature. Physical detention
is relatively easy to identify. Psychological detention can be more amorphous. It
arises either where 1) failure to comply with a police demand or direction gives rise
to liability, or 2) a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state’s conduct
that he or she had no choice but to comply with a direction or demand.45 It is some-
times difficult to pinpoint the precise moment at which a detention commences.
Once it does, the rights under section 10 of the Charter are immediately engaged.
Section 10(a) imposes a duty on police to advise the detainee of the reasons for
the detention.46 Section 10(b) defines the right to counsel and imposes two sets of
obligations on police: 1) informational obligations, and 2) implementational obliga-
tions.47 The informational obligations require police to advise the detainee of the
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, and the availability of free legal
advice from a duty counsel at a 1-800 number.48 This information must be given
42 R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, 144 (Can.); see VERDUN-JONES & TIJERINO, supra
note 41, at 33.
43 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 10, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
44 Compare R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 462 (Can.) (stating that the confessions
rule protects statements given during “the arrest, detention, examination or prosecution of the
accused” (quoting R. v. A.B. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 7, 26 (Can.))), with Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, s 10, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) (stating that the right to be informed and retain counsel without delay
is available only for arrestees and detainees).
45 R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 para. 30, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 353, 378–79 (Can.).
46 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 10, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
47 R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, 239 (Can.).
48 See id. at 241, 279.
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“immediately.”49 The implementational obligations require that police provide a
reasonable opportunity for the detainee to exercise the right to counsel (such as the
provision of a phone, in private) and that the police refrain from eliciting evidence
until the reasonable opportunity has been provided.
Sometimes police will be constitutionally obliged to provide another caution,
known as the “Prosper warning.”50 If a person asks to speak to counsel and then
changes their mind, police must tell the person that they still have a right to contact
a lawyer and that, during this time, the police cannot take any statements until they
had had a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer.51 In effect, the police must
advise the person of what they are giving up.
The following would be a typical section 10(b) caution given by police upon
detention:
I am arresting you for [name of offence(s)].
You have the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
You also have the right to free and immediate legal advice from
duty counsel by making free telephone calls to [toll-free phone
number(s)] during business hours and [toll-free phone num-
ber(s)] during non-business hours.
Do you understand?
Do you wish to call a lawyer now?
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
Criminal law within the UK is jurisdictionally differentiated and normatively
complex. The criminal law addressed in my contribution is the law and practice of
England and Wales, comprising a single, unified legal jurisdiction. Scotland and
Northern Ireland have their own, entirely separate criminal justice systems, and
Scottish law, in particular, diverges from English law in many significant ways.52
English criminal procedure law, broadly encompassing the doctrinal aspects of police
interrogation of criminal suspects, continues to be informed by common law think-
ing. The structure of criminal proceedings in England and Wales is fundamentally
adversarial. There is no consolidated criminal code in either substantive criminal law
or criminal procedure. Traditional common law precedents remain a primary source of
procedural law, but nowadays they increasingly play a subordinate role as authoritative
49 See id. at 241.
50 See id. at 278.
51 See id.
52 Cf. Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, [4], [22]–[24]; Pamela R. Ferguson, Re-
percussions of the Cadder Case: The ECHR’s Fair Trial Provisions and Scottish Criminal
Procedure, 2011 CRIM.L.REV.743, 744, 746; Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, North of the Border
and Across the Channel: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and France, 2013
CRIM. L. REV. 369, 369–70, 382–84.
See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes of Practice
Crown Court Compendium
See
See What We Do and Why
See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Code G Revised Code of Practice
for the Statutory Power of Arrest by Police Officers
Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984 (PACE) Code C Revised Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
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be received into evidence. Strictly speaking, the method need not be determinative,
except to the extent that statutory provisions envisage an interview process and
stipulate the obligations on investigating officers in respect of that process. However,
it is the case that anything that takes place during the course of an interview is to be
regarded as part of the interview or interrogation. If a conversation takes place be-
tween police officers in the presence of an accused during an interview, it is part of
the circumstances to be taken into account in assessing the admissibility of any
admissions made by the accused. However, if the conversation is hearsay in nature
(as opposed, for instance, to a discussion about what materials to show the accused)
and it does not elicit relevant information from the accused, the conversation would
be excised from an otherwise admissible interview. The basis here is that the
conversation is irrelevant and inadmissible, in the same way as opinions expressed
by the interviewing officers would ordinarily be deleted. Similarly, if information is
provided to the accused, the fact that it is not direct questioning will not prevent it
from being part of the interview or interrogation.122
The showing of evidence to an accused is a routine aspect of questioning, whether
in the interview room, at the scene of the alleged offence, or during the course of a
search of the accused’s home or business premises, during which the accused may
identify or explain items. All such interactions may properly be regarded as inter-
views and, in the case of serious charges, will be recorded on video, unless there is
a reasonable excuse for the interview not being recorded.123
To the extent that the question is concerned with when a caution is required, in
Western Australia, the obligation to give the caution as soon as practicable after the
arrest will ordinarily mean that the accused will be cautioned very shortly, if not
immediately, after the arrest. If an accused were to make an admission as a result of
hearing a conversation between the investigating officers after his arrest, but before
a formal interview, it would likely be after he has been cautioned and informed of
his other rights. The admissibility of the admission would not depend on whether
it was part of an interrogation, but whether it was voluntary.124 If exclusion were
sought in the exercise of the court’s discretion, all of the surrounding circumstances
would be taken into account to determine the questions of fairness and public policy.
It is perhaps worth noting that things said or done by an undercover officer
during a covert operation, such as the controlled purchase of drugs, the infiltration
of a criminal gang, or the online detection of persons seeking to engage in sexual
activity with children, do not constitute interrogations for the purposes under dis-
cussion. Nor are pretext calls made by complainants, or conversations conducted
with the accused by associates at the request of the police, provided they do not
122 See, e.g., id. at 331–32.
123 The statutory provisions will be discussed in answer to a later question, see infra note
327 and accompanying text.
124 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 189 (Austl.); Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR
396, 398–402 (Austl.).
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become the “functional equivalent of an interrogation” by an agent of the police, and
they do not cut across a clearly expressed exercise of the right to silence.125 If a con-
fession is elicited by an undercover police officer in circumstances which the court
finds to be akin to an interrogation and in unfair derogation of the suspect’s right to
exercise a free choice to speak or to be silent, the evidence may be excluded in the
exercise of discretion.126
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
“Interrogation” is not a term of art in Canada. It is used interchangeably with
“questioning” and “interviewing,” though interrogation tends to connote more aggres-
sive police inquiry.127
Police use various techniques to elicit evidence from suspects, some more ag-
gressive than others. The “Reid Technique” is still used by many Canadian police
agencies.128 It is predicated on the goal of manipulating and breaking down the
suspect’s will. While there has been some judicial criticism of this technique, the
courts have given some latitude to police to use manipulation to coax a suspect into
speaking. This is subject to circumstances that would amount to oppression, threats,
or other factors that might vitiate voluntariness.129
Admissibility of statements does not depend exclusively on what is said by the
police and the suspect. Virtually anything that happens in the interview room is open
for consideration, be it showing of evidence, or conversation between officers in the
suspect’s presence. Anything that might have influenced the suspect’s decision to
speak is properly considered when assessing voluntariness and, in some instances,
constitutional compliance.
125 Swaffield, 192 CLR at 178, 184–85 (Brennan J); id. at 203 (Toohey, Gaudron & Gummow
JJ); id. at 220–25 (Kirby J). See generally R v Anderson [2008] QDC 137 (7 March 2008)
(Austl.) for a first instance decision in the District Court of Queensland in which a complainant
in a sexual offence case, who conducted a pretext call with the accused, was found to be the
agent of the police and to have engaged in a functional interrogation. The evidence was ex-
cluded. Id. at 11.
126 Swaffield, 192 CLR at 197.
127 E.g., R. v. M.J.S., 2000 ABPC 44, paras. 18–19 (Can.).
128 See id. para. 19.
129 As described in R. v. M.J.S., id. para. 19:
The Reid technique involves a skilful development of “themes”
and suggestions put to the suspect in a rapid fire and high intensity manner
where the interrogator stays in complete control of the situation. On the
rare occasions when there is an opportunity for the accused to respond
any disagreement is immediately ignored or overridden and, in particular,
any denial is countered with a shift to another theme, or a cutoff remark
such as “we are beyond that point—we know you did it” this technique
is used over 40 times. Many of the “themes” place blame away from the
accused, or minimize any intentional wrong doing.
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ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
PACE Code C defines an “interview” (terminology generally preferred to the
more aggressive-sounding “interrogation”) as “the questioning of a person regarding
their involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence or offences.”130
This definition complements section 37 of PACE 1984, which authorizes a custody
officer to detain a person who is under arrest where there are “reasonable grounds for
believing that the person’s detention without being charged is necessary to secure
or preserve evidence relating to an offence for which the person is under arrest or
to obtain such evidence by questioning the person.”131
Nothing else formally qualifies in English law as an “interview” with a suspect.
Police questioning that is not “regarding” a particular individual’s “involvement or
suspected involvement in a criminal offence or offences” is not an interview,132 so
police officers are free to make general inquiries of members of the public, and even
to query apparently suspicious behaviour if that is not directly offence-related.
Citizens are not legally obliged to answer speculative police questions, though an
uncooperative or uncivil response may in itself be treated as suspicious and afford-
ing grounds for lawful arrest.
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
The word “interrogation” seems to envisage direct, focused, and insistent question-
ing; however, more subtle means may be equally—or more—effective in obtaining
admissions from a suspect and therefore ought to be considered interrogation.133
Guidance in this regard can be taken from caselaw in the context of undercover opera-
tions, discussed more fully below. In such cases, the Courts have adopted an “active
elicitation” test which, whilst articulations are varied, focuses largely on the question
of whether the police caused the accused to make admissions.134 If so, the interaction
engaged in is considered the “functional equivalent” of an interrogation.135
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
In Rhode Island v. Innis,136 the Court made clear that interrogation not only
includes express questioning but also “its functional equivalent.”137 “[F]unctional
equivalent” was defined as “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions
130 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 11.1A.
131 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, s. 37(3) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
132 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 11.1A.
133 R v Harrison [2014] NZHC 2246 at [31] (N.Z.).
134 R v Kumar [2015] NZSC 124 at [4]–[5] (N.Z.).
135 Id. at [43].
136 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
137 Id. at 301.
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of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.”138 Nonetheless, the Court noted
that “[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibil-
ity of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in
determining” what the police reasonably should have known.139
With that understanding, the Court determined that the conversation between the
officers in Innis did not constitute interrogation. After the police arrested Innis and
gave him his Miranda rights, Innis requested counsel. The police put Innis in the
back of a patrol car and began driving to the police station. During the drive, the
officers discussed the fact that there was a school for handicapped children nearby
and that it would be a terrible thing if one of them found a loaded weapon and maybe
ended up hurting or even killing themselves.140 At that point, Innis told the officers
to turn the car around so he could show them where he hid the gun.141
Finding the conversation between the officers was not an interrogation, the
Court said:
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers
were aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an
appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped
children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the
police knew that the respondent was unusually disoriented or
upset . . . .142
Between 1990 and 1993, one police interrogation expert sat in on 122 felony
interrogations and viewed another 60 taped interrogations.143 One of his many ob-
servations was: “In approximately 90% of the interrogations . . . , the detective
confronted the suspect with evidence (whether true or false) of his guilt and then
138 Id. (footnotes omitted). This point is especially important in cases involving vulnerable
suspects, discussed infra text accompanying notes 505–06.
139 Id. at 302 n.8.
140 Id. at 294–95.
141 Id. at 295.
142 Id. at 302–03. The Court came to a different conclusion in the earlier case of Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), also known as the “Christian Burial Speech” case, where the
defendant was accused of murdering a nine-year-old girl. Id. at 390–91. Like Innis, that case also
involved officers driving a defendant to a police station after giving him Miranda warnings.
Id. at 391. Unlike Innis, however, the case was decided under the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 401. Also, where the officers had no knowledge of Innis’s specific characteristics
or susceptibilities, the officers in Williams knew that Williams was a former mental patient and
was deeply religious. Id. at 412. So, when they told him the blizzard-like weather conditions
might soon make it impossible for them to find the body of the little girl, preventing her parents
from giving her a Christian burial, the Court held the speech was tantamount to interrogation. Id.
143 Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
268 (1996).
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suggested that the suspect’s self-interest would be advanced if he confessed.”144
Both tactics are intended to elicit confessions and therefore would appear to require
the giving of Miranda warnings.145 Both can be permissible, although showing a
suspect false evidence may, in rare circumstances, result in exclusion of the confes-
sion. For most courts, however, the decision does not turn on whether the deception
involved a false document or a verbal lie, but on whether the action in question was
likely to induce a false confession.146
C. Can police lie to suspects to elicit an incriminating statement?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
The question is best answered by saying that the use of deception by police to
elicit an incriminating statement will not necessarily result in the statement being
inadmissible or being excluded by the court in the exercise of discretion.147
In the Australian jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Evidence Act,148
if a police officer makes a false statement in the course of questioning a suspect, in
circumstances in which he or she knows, or ought reasonably to have known, that
the statement is false and that making the false statement is likely to cause the
person who is being questioned to make an admission, any admission or derivative
evidence obtained as a result will have been obtained improperly, and will not be
admitted unless the court determines in the exercise of discretion that “the desirabil-
ity of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence.”149
In the other jurisdictions, the issue of the admissibility of such evidence is determined
according to common law principles. Even in the jurisdictions with the Uniform
Evidence Act, the common law will apply when admissions are obtained in circum-
stances other than by formal questioning.
In some older cases, it had been held that false representations would negate
voluntariness, and in the High Court decision of Cleland v The Queen, Judge Murphy
suggested “[i]t may be a question of classification whether a confession induced by
false representations or other trickery is voluntary.”150 However, in Tofilau, the High
Court held that deception alone would not render the elicited admission involuntary,
144 Id. at 279.
145 “[P]olice are trained to interrogate only those suspects whose culpability they ‘establish’
on the basis of their initial investigation.” Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010).
146 Marcus, supra note 87, at 614–15.
147 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 220 (Austl.); Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR
396, 408–09 (Austl.).
148 The Commonwealth, NSW, Victoria, the ACT, and Tasmania.
149 See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) S 138 (Austl.).
150 (1982) 151 CLR 1, 13 (Austl.) (referring to Reg. v Johnston (1864) 15 ICLR 60 (U.K.);
Attorney-General (NSW) v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 (Austl.)).
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although, as Chief Justice Gleeson noted: “Since possible forms of deception are
bounded only by human imagination, and human gullibility, it would be dangerous
to assert that no form of deception could deprive conduct of its voluntary character.”151
Nevertheless, his Honour went on to say, “Most deception used in the hope of
eliciting admissions . . . is calculated to induce a person to choose to reveal informa-
tion that otherwise would be concealed.”152 Choice is at the core of voluntariness.
As a general proposition, the common law in Australia, following English au-
thority, is that “[s]ubterfuge, ruses and tricks may be lawfully employed by police,
acting in the public interest” and evidence obtained in the course of, or through, such
activities will not necessarily be excluded.153 It has often been said that the investiga-
tion of crime is “not a game governed by a sportsman’s code of fair play.”154
In Tofilau, four of the judges distinguished the common law position from a
repealed section of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), namely section 410(1), which, for
most of the twentieth century, had provided, in part, that “no confession, admission
or statement shall be received in evidence against an accused person if it has been
induced . . . by any untrue representation made to him,” which was a reference to a
deliberately false statement.155 Chief Justice Gleeson noted that the repealed provision
was “unusual, and went beyond the common law.”156 As the plurality wrote, that had
been recognised to be the case in Basto v The Queen where the High Court said that
section 410(1)(a) made a “statutory extension of the common law doctrine . . . to
untrue representations.”157
Although the general position is that deception alone will not result in the ex-
clusion of confessional evidence, the particular circumstances of a case in which
deception is used by the police may result in discretionary exclusion of the evidence.
The authorities in this area are cases involving confessions or relevant admissions
obtained by the use of deception in circumstances other than formal interviews. It
would be unusual for law enforcement officers to lie to an accused during the course
of an interview in order to elicit an admission, especially in an age in which inter-
views are almost invariably recorded on video. While the community (from which a
jury will be empaneled) may be accepting, or prepared to tolerate, the use of deception
151 Tofilau, 231 CLR at 409.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 220 (Austl.) (Kirby J); id. at 198 (Toohey, Gaudron
& Gummow JJ).
154 Id. at 185 (Brennan CJ); Bunning v Cross (1978) 19 ALR 641, 659 (Austl.) (Stephen
& Aickin JJ); Tofilau, 231 CLR at 442 (Kirby J).
155 Tofilau, 231 CLR at 408 (Gleeson CJ); id. at 509 (Callinan, Heydon & Crennan JJ);
see also R v Connors [1990] 20 NSWLR 438, 438 (Austl.) (as to the meaning of “untrue
representation”).
156 Tofilau, 231 CLR at 408.
157 Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628, 640 (Austl.) (Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto
& Taylor JJ).
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in covert activities so that the police can solve serious crimes and bring to justice
dangerous criminals, the use of lies in a formal setting is less likely to be met with
approval. To put it bluntly, it is not a good look, particularly if the same officers will
be required to give oral testimony. It is also fraught if the accused does not make any
admission, and the lies are subsequently used by the defence to attack the credibility
of the police evidence more broadly. What is not unusual, is the framing of questions
in a way that may imply to the suspect the existence of certain facts that may be
speculative at the time of the interview, for instance: “Is there any reason why your
DNA would be on the knife?” If ultimately there is no evidence of DNA on the knife
that matches the accused’s profile, such a question and the answer ought to be
excluded (by editing) on the basis that it would be unfair to the accused at trial.
More particularly, if the police were to lie to a suspect about his or her rights, that
would be a contravention of the officers’ statutory obligations to inform an accused
of his or her rights and to afford those rights to the accused. As I will explain later,
where such a contravention is established, the evidence is inadmissible, unless the
court decides otherwise, having regard to a number of factors. However, the lines
become blurred when the police obtain authority to make a covert recording, even
as they remain in their role as police officers.
In Em v The Queen, the accused challenged the trial judge’s decision not to
exclude covertly recorded admissions pursuant to the fairness discretion.158 It was
submitted that unfairness arose as a consequence of the police exploiting the ac-
cused’s belief that the conversation was not being recorded and consequently could
not be used in evidence. A majority of the High Court rejected the submission, es-
sentially on the basis that a mistaken assumption that a confession was not being
recorded could not, without more, be unfair.159 Significantly, Chief Justice Gleeson
and Justice Heydon said: “To reach the opposite conclusion would be for the judiciary,
by exercise of its capacity to reach a judgment characterising conduct as ‘unfair’
under § 90, to create an automatic and universal rule of exclusion in place of a pro-
vision calling for case-by-case judgment.”160
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
Yes, but there are limits.
Canadian courts have recognized that, in order for police to effectively combat
crime, they must be able to match the ingenuity of those whom they are investigat-
ing. Therefore, some degree of deceit is permissible. Police may tell a suspect that
his DNA was found at the scene, or that an accomplice “spilled the beans,” even if
these things are not true. This strategy is not, however, without limits. In some cases,
the effect of the lie may, together with other circumstances, amount to oppression.
158 (2007) 232 CLR 67, 71 (Austl.).
159 Id. at 92 (Gleeson CJ & Heydon J); id. at 105, 106–07.
160 Id. at 92.
936 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:909
That is, it may cause the suspect to believe that nothing he says will establish his
innocence and he might as well speak. In other instances, the lie might be such as
to shock the conscience of the community. Police in Canada can resort to tricks, but
not dirty tricks.
In Rothman v. The Queen, then-Justice Lamer said:
It must also be borne in mind that the investigation of crime and
the detection of criminals is not a game to be governed by the
Marquess of Queens-bury rules. The authorities, in dealing with
shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of
necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and should not
through the rule be hampered in their work. What should be re-
pressed vigorously is conduct on their part that shocks the com-
munity. That a police officer pretend to be a lock-up chaplain and
hear a suspect’s confession is conduct that shocks the commu-
nity; so is pretending to be the duty legal-aid lawyer eliciting in
that way incriminating statements from suspects or accused;
injecting Pentothal into a diabetic suspect pretending it is his
daily shot of insulin and using his statement in evidence would
also shock the community; but generally speaking, pretending
to be a hard drug addict to break a drug ring would not shock the
community; nor would, as in this case, pretending to be a truck
driver to secure the conviction of a trafficker; in fact, what would
shock the community would be preventing the police from re-
sorting to such a trick.161
Dirty tricks would also include those that have the effect of undermining the suspect’s
right to silence. The placement of an undercover operative in a cell with a suspect
is not per se objectionable. However, the undercover operative is not permitted to
actively elicit evidence from the suspect. This would constitute a dirty trick in that it
would undermine the suspect’s right to silence in circumstances in which he cannot
walk away. This principle, established in the case of R. v. Hebert, only applies to
suspects who are detained.162
Undercover operations aimed at suspects out of custody are not subject to the
same limitations, given that the suspect can walk away. On the other hand, some
operations, such as the “Mr. Big” scenario raise a host of other problems. I will ad-
dress Mr. Big in a later portion of this Article.
161 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 697 (Can.). In R. v. Rowe (2006), 209 O.A.C. 50, paras. 44–46,
49–50 (Can. Ont. C.A.), a police officer pretending to be a religious figure was held not to be
a dirty trick.
162 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 181 (Can.).
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ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
During police interviews, deception, if employed at all, will generally take the
form of selective disclosure and misleading by suggestion or omission rather than
downright lies. PACE Code C mandates that, prior to interview, suspects “must be
given sufficient information to enable them to understand the nature of any . . .
offence [about which they will be questioned], and why they are suspected of com-
mitting it,” but it is added that “this does not require the disclosure of details at a
time which might prejudice the criminal investigation.”163 Moreover, “[t]he decision
about what needs to be disclosed for the purpose of this requirement . . . rests with
the investigating officer who has sufficient knowledge of the case to make that de-
cision.”164 One recent small-scale empirical study found that police interviewers
routinely withhold information prior to interview, exaggerate the weight of ostensibly
incriminating information in their possession, and employ selective disclosure to test
suspects’ veracity and potentially catch them out in lies or contradictions.165
Police interviewing practice in England and Wales has undergone significant
professionalization since the PACE reforms of the 1980s and chastening experiences
of (historical and contemporary) miscarriages of justice emerging in the 1990s. The
national College of Policing characterizes interviews with suspects, victims, and
witnesses as a highly skilled activity which is “a crucial element of the process of
investigation” and “central to the success of an investigation.”166 Detectives are now
taught a national “PEACE” investigative interviewing protocol167 designed to elicit
the maximum amount of reliable information, which is often best achieved, it is now
appreciated, simply by stating the grounds for arrest and inviting suspects to respond
to open-ended, neutral questions. As interviews develop, police questioning can
legitimately become more probing and persistent—suspects may lie, after all—so
long as it remains “careful and consistent but not unfair or oppressive.”168 The old
163 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 11.1A. What amounts to “sufficient information” is
context-specific,
but it should normally include, as a minimum, a description of the facts
relating to the suspected offence that are known to the officer, including
the time and place in question. This aims to avoid suspects being con-
fused or unclear about what they are supposed to have done and to help
an innocent suspect to clear the matter up more quickly.
Id. Note 11ZA.
164 Id.
165 See generally Divya Sukumar, Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Kimberley A. Wade, Behind
Closed Doors: Live Observations of Current Police Station Disclosure Practices and Lawyer-
Client Consultations, 2016 CRIM. L. REV. 900.
166 Investigation—Investigative Interviewing, COLL. POLICING, http://www.app.college.po
lice.uk/app-content/investigations/investigative-interviewing/#peace-framework [https://perma
.cc/B6TX-LSV4] (last visited May 6, 2021).
167 The “PEACE” mnemonic stands for Planning and preparation; Engage and explain;
Account clarification and challenge; Closure; Evaluation.
168 Id. “Oppression” and “unfairness” are grounds for excluding confessions at trial under
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prescientific approach of wheedling, cajoling, and coercing suspects into a confes-
sion, as the overriding objective of a successful interrogation (seemingly irrespective
of reliability or authenticity),169 has been jettisoned, at any rate. Police interviews in
England and Wales have routinely been recorded since the late 1980s, and alongside
other PACE safeguards—notably including more effective access to custodial legal
advice—have exposed policing interview practice to wider judicial and public scru-
tiny. For any officers still tempted towards the dark arts, investigative impropriety
is a lot harder to conceal, and to get away with, than it used to be.
Incriminating statements (or other conduct) may be ruled inadmissible at trial
if they fall foul of either the dedicated rules regulating confession evidence, now pri-
marily contained in PACE 1984 section 76, or a more general exclusionary jurisdic-
tion conferred on trial judges by PACE 1984 section 78 to exclude seriously “unfair”
prosecution evidence.170 The most significant limitation on police deception during
custodial interrogation is that officers must not deliberately mislead the suspect’s
lawyer (in England and Wales, this will generally be a solicitor or somebody em-
ployed by a firm of solicitors to provide custodial legal advice—formerly “law
clerks,” and nowadays compendiously described as “police station advisers”).
Paragraph 3.1 of PACE Code C requires the custody officer171 to notify detainees
on their arrival at the police station of their rights: to have someone informed of their
detention, to consult privately with a solicitor, and to be provided with copies of the
PACE Codes of Practice for consultation. The suspect must also be given written
notification of these key rights.172 If the suspect does not know any solicitor, he must
be advised of the availability of duty solicitors whose services are provided free of
charge.173 Subject to limited exceptions, a suspect who asks for legal advice may not
be interviewed until he has received it, either in person or by telephone. Moreover, sus-
pects are entitled to be accompanied by their legal adviser during the police interview
itself,174 a highly significant procedural protection in an adversarial system of justice.
It is not possible to state with confidence whether a particular instance of police
deception will result in the exclusion of a suspect’s admissions during interview in
any given case. Everything turns on the facts. It is safe to say, however, that if police
PACE 1984. College of Policing guidance points out, however, that “[c]onducting an investiga-
tive interview is not the same as proving an argument in court. This means that interviewers
are not bound by the same rules of evidence that lawyers must abide by.”
169 For a detailed illustration, see David Dixon, Integrity, Interrogation and Criminal Injustice,
in THE INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 75 (Hunter, Roberts, Young & Dixon eds., 2016).
170 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, ss. 76, 78 (Eng.).
171 An independent officer unconnected with the current investigation: see infra notes
350–51 and accompanying text.
172 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 3.2.
173 Id. at 6.1, Notes 6B & 6J.
174 Id. at 6.8. The solicitor can be required to leave only if “their conduct is such that the inter-
viewer is unable properly to put questions to the suspect.” Id. at 6.9; see also id. at 6.10–6.11,
Notes 6D & 6E.
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interviewers deliberately tell lies to legally represented suspects during custodial
interrogations, they are running a serious risk that a trial court in England and Wales
will regard such conduct as undermining the substantive value of suspects’ rights
and will consequently rule any resulting statements inadmissible. In one significant
judgment, the Court of Appeal stated:
It is obvious from the undisputed evidence that the police
practised a deceit not only upon the appellant, which is bad
enough, but also upon the solicitor whose duty it was to advise
him. In effect, they hoodwinked both solicitor and client. That
was a most reprehensible thing to do. . . . This is not the place to
discipline the police. That has been made clear here on a number
of previous occasions. We are concerned with the application of
the proper law. . . . [T]he only question to be answered by this
court is whether, having regard to the way the police behaved,
the judge exercised that discretion correctly. In our judgment he
did not. He omitted a vital factor from his consideration, namely,
the deceit practised upon the appellant’s solicitor.175
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
There are no specific rules prohibiting the police from lying to a suspect in order
to elicit an incriminating statement.176 A common form of deception on the part of
the police in this context is through the adoption of undercover investigative methods
which are discussed more fully below. At this point, it is noteworthy that evidence
obtained from undercover operations has been ruled admissible by New Zealand
courts.177 This indicates that the lies integral in such methods are not of themselves
considered to be improper or unfair.
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
Police can lie to suspects. But the methods police may use extend far beyond
lies. In a 2015 survey of 340 highly experienced law enforcement interrogators, 84.7%
were trained in “using deceit.”178
175 R v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 (CA) 144 ( Eng.).
176 But see Elias, supra note 69, at 2 (noting Clause 4 of the Practice Note clarifies earlier
law by imposing a positive obligation on the police to fairly explain the substance of statements
or the nature of the evidence against a suspect when these matters are the subject of questions
posed by the police). Evidence of the defendant’s statement was excluded in one recent case be-
cause the police had misled the defendant about the strength of the other evidence in their posses-
sion which identified him as the offender. See R v. Hennessey [2009] NZCA 363 at [37] (N.Z.).
177 See R v. Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [308] (N.Z.).
178 Hayley M.D. Cleary & Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and Interroga-
tion Methods: A Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 270, 275 (2016).
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The Court in Miranda described with apparent distaste many of the deceptive
interrogation techniques contained in Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, Fred
E. Inbau & John E. Reid’s leading book on interrogations, published in 1962. The tech-
niques, collectively known as “the Reid Technique,” included prolonged interroga-
tions in private rooms, “Mutt and Jeff” friendly-unfriendly routines, lying about lineup
results, and minimization and maximization techniques which include giving suspects
excuses for what they were accused of doing or maximizing certainty of guilt to give
suspects a feeling of hopelessness. These same techniques continue to be taught by
the Reid organization179 and remain the most common interrogation techniques used
by U.S. law enforcement today.180
Despite its distaste for the techniques, the Court did not limit their use. Instead,
it imposed the warnings requirement to ensure confessions were voluntary and did
not violate a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In Illinois
v. Perkins, the Court explained:
Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by tak-
ing advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes
to be a fellow prisoner. . . . Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compul-
sion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.181
Since Miranda, the Court has consistently avoided creating limits on the use of
deception. In Frazier v. Cupp, for example, the defendant’s confession was admitted
even though the police falsely told him that another man he had been seen with had
confessed and implicated him.182 In a number of cases involving deception which
were decided on other issues, the Court simply ruled without commenting on the
deceptive techniques.183
The Court’s silence has given the lower courts what one commentator called
“carte blanche” to engage in deceptive practices, practices which the availability of
DNA testing has revealed often result in false confessions.184 A recent study by the
Innocence Project shows that of 365 persons exonerated by DNA between 1989 and
179 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 n.9 (1966) (discussing the extensive use of
the techniques described by the Reid organization). See generally FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E.
REID, JOSEPH P.BUCKLEY &BRIAN C. JAYNE,CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(4th ed. 2004).
180 Cleary & Warner, supra note 178, at 271.
181 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (citations omitted).
182 See generally 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
183 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493–96 (1977) (per curiam) (finding for
Miranda purposes, the fact that police falsely told defendant they found his fingerprints at
the scene was irrelevant).
184 Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police,
76 OR. L. REV. 775, 781 (1997).
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2020, 29% involved false confessions and 49% of the false confessors were age
twenty-one or younger.185 Notably, 60% of the 365 exonerees were Black.186 Despite
these statistics, courts continue to uphold interrogations involving deceit.187
Not long ago, however, these statistics found their way into the dissent in a murder
case dramatized by the popular Netflix series, Making a Murderer. The dissent pointed
out: “Our long-held idea that innocent people do not confess to crimes has been
upended by advances in DNA profiling. We know now that in approximately 25% of
homicide cases in which convicted persons have later been unequivocally exoner-
ated by DNA evidence, the suspect falsely confessed to committing the crime.”188
Just last year, some of the tactics taught by the Reid organization were prominently
featured and disparaged in When They See Us, another popular Netflix documentary
seen by over 2.3 million households worldwide within the first two weeks of its re-
lease.189 The documentary dramatized the well-publicized 1989 case (then–New
York City Mayor Edward Koch called it “the crime of the century”) of five Black
youths who were wrongly charged and convicted of the rape and murder of a white
woman while jogging in New York City’s Central Park. In the program’s last episode,
a prosecutor harshly criticizes a detective for using the Reid Technique to coerce a con-
fession from a suspect and sneers that the technique has been “universally rejected.”190
D. What would be an improper/illegal interrogation in your jurisdiction?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
The propriety or legality of an interrogation goes to the admissibility or discre-
tionary exclusion of the confession or relevant admissions obtained. In that context,
185 DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocence
project.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/4KZX-R6DC] (last visited
May 6, 2021).
186 Id.
187 Slobogin, supra note 184, at 780–81; see also Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil:
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 451 (1996) (“With no absolute prohibi-
tion of police lying during interrogation, courts today are free to condone such lying.”).
188 Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 333 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2677
(2018) (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
189 Rick Porter, Ava DuVernay’s ‘When They See Us’ Seen by 23 Million, Netflix Says,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 26, 2019, 8:37 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed
/ava-duvernays-they-see-us-seen-by-23-million-netflix-says-1221069 [https://perma.cc
/K47U-YBQZ].
190 Tal Dickstein & Kamilah Moore, Reid v. Netflix, LOEB &LOEB LLP, https://www.loeb
.com/en/insights/publications/2020/04/reid-v-netflix [https://perma.cc/9WD4-NVK6] (Mar. 24,
2020). To this point, in 2017, Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates, an industry leader in inter-
viewing and interrogation techniques, announced it would stop training detectives in the Reid
training method and, ironically, would only use the technique to teach police about the risks
of false confessions. Eli Hager, The Seismic Change in Police Interrogations, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/07/the-seis
mic-change-in-police-interrogations [https://perma.cc/ACF4-Z6W9].
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an interrogation will be improper or illegal if it involves conduct that (a) contravenes
legislative requirements that must be met by officers dealing with arrested suspects;
(b) involves inducements by persons in authority or the overbearing of the suspect’s
will, such as to render any confession involuntary (the two “definite rules” I referred
to earlier);191 or (c) would justify exclusion of any confession or admission in the
exercise of discretion, because it would be unfair to allow the prosecution to use the
confession against the accused or because of public policy considerations.
A confession is presumed to have been made voluntarily, unless an issue is raised
by the accused as to its admissibility or the circumstances give rise to a doubt about
its voluntariness.192 In such a case, the confession will be excluded unless the prosecu-
tion establishes to the satisfaction of the presiding judicial officer, on the balance of
probabilities, that the confession was made voluntarily.193 A confession will not be
voluntary if it was obtained (a) as a result of the accused’s will being overborne, for
instance as a result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or
undue insistence or pressure (“basal voluntariness”), or (b) in consequence of a threat
or promise made or held out by a person in authority (an inducement). In short, an
accused must have spoken from a free choice to answer questions. The original
rationale for these rules was concern about the unreliability of statements made
under coercion. Some of the forms of conduct contemplated may be “illegal” as well
as improper, if they constitute offences (for instance, an unlawful assault or threat).
The courts have been reluctant to make specific rules for particular factual circum-
stances, preferring to rely on the broad articulation of the rules, to which I have
referred, and leaving it for judgment on a case-by-case basis as to whether the confes-
sion is voluntary. However, comparison with other cases may be instructive in pre-
dicting how a court may rule. Improper conduct affecting “basal voluntariness” will
include the use of physical force as well as non-physical intimidation or duress. It may
involve deprivations (for instance of sustenance or sleep). On the other hand, persis-
tence in questioning, even after an indication by the accused that she does not wish to
answer questions, does not necessarily amount to “undue insistence or pressure.”194
As for threats and promises, it is a matter of assessment in the circumstances of
the particular case whether the threat or promise was of such a kind as to induce the
191 See Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396, 410–22 (Austl.) (discussing the develop-
ment of the common law regulating the exclusion of evidence of out-of-court confessions);
MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512, 519–20 (Austl.); McDermott v The King
(1948) 76 CLR 501, 511 (Austl.); Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235, 245 (Austl.).
192 R v Williams (1992) 8 WAR 265, 271 (Austl.); Hough v Ah Sam (1912) 15 CLR 452,
457 (Austl.).
193 Williams, 8 WAR at 271–72; MacPherson, 147 CLR at 519; Wendo v The Queen (1963)
109 CLR 559, 572–73 (Austl.).
194 See Western Australia v Smith [2010] WASC 279 (1 October 2010) 3, 6–7 (Austl.);
Slater v Western Australia [2009] WASC 144 (8 May 2009) 8 (Austl.); Malgil v Western
Australia [2008] WASC 290 (10 December 2008) 14 (Austl.).
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confession. Promising a suspect that he will be released on bail if he admits his part
in the offence is an obvious inducement.
The overbearing conduct or inducement must have had an operative effect on
the accused’s choice to answer questions, but the burden is on the prosecution to
establish on the balance of probabilities that either the conduct, threat, or promise
did not occur or that it did not have an operative effect.
In the jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Evidence Act, the law has
been modified by statute.195 In each of those jurisdictions, section 84 (which is not
confined to criminal proceedings) provides that, if the party against whom the evidence
is to be adduced raises an issue about its admissibility, evidence of an admission by
that party is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the making of the
admission was not influenced by:
(a) violent, oppressive, inhuman, or degrading conduct, whether towards
the person who made the admission or towards another person; or
(b) a threat of conduct of that kind.
Section 85(2), which applies only to criminal proceedings, provides that
“[e]vidence of the admission [by a defendant] is not admissible unless the circum-
stances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the
truth of the admission was adversely affected.”196 Factors that are relevant to be
taken into account include (i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which
they were put and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made
to the person questioned.
Factors that are relevant to discretionary exclusion may include whether the ac-
cused was able to understand and communicate in English, was placed under pressure,
had adequate breaks and sustenance, and was not pressed to continue whilst fatigued.197
Another factor may be whether police have persisted with questioning after a sus-
pect has indicated a wish not to answer further questions. Other circumstances that
have led to exclusion of confessional evidence in the exercise of discretion have in-
cluded where detention was unlawful; because officers failed to bring the accused
before a magistrate or bail justice;198 a failure to caution the accused and tell him of
his right to communicate with a friend, relative, or lawyer;199 and an unlawful arrest
of the accused and holding him incommunicado for the purpose of questioning.200
195 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 84–86 (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 84–86 (Austl.);
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) ss 84–86 (Austl.); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 84–86 (Austl.);
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 84–86 (Austl.).
196 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 85 (Austl.).
197 For an example of how this is considered, see Western Australia v Gibson [2014]
WASC 240 (4 July 2014) 21–22 (Austl.).
198 See, e.g., Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.).
199 See generally Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 (Austl.).
200 E.g., Foster v The Queen (1993) 113 ALR 1, 7 (Austl.).
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CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
Improper questioning would include the following:
• Any questioning that follows a breach of section 10 of the Charter;
• Any questioning that results in an involuntary statement; and
• Questioning that results in a violation of the right to silence in section
7 of the Charter.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
Remarkably, the legality of police detention for questioning was not settled at
common law until as recently as the early 1980s.201 In reality, by mid-century at the
latest, police officers in England and Wales were routinely detaining suspects for
questioning on the euphemistic pretext that suspects were “helping the police with
their inquiries.” These blurred lines left suspects exposed in a legal no-man’s-land,
without any proper juridical framework to regulate their detention or to safeguard
their procedural rights. It was a system of studied non-regulation ripe for abuse.
PACE 1984 was enacted with the express purpose of regularizing police detention
and subjecting it to the rule of law. Section 37 authorizes detention where a “custody
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that [the suspect’s] detention without
being charged is necessary . . . to obtain . . . evidence by questioning [him].”202
PACE also mandated that custodial interrogation would henceforth be strictly
delimited and supervised. Section 37 implies that investigative203 questioning in
relation to any particular offence should cease as soon as there is sufficient evidence
to support a formal criminal charge, though it is permissible to ask further questions “to
clear up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement” or to put new information
to the suspect where “in the interests of justice . . . the detainee . . . [should] have an
opportunity to comment . . . .”204 Questioning may continue in relation to other
201 See Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke [1984] 1 AC 437 (HL) 445–46.
202 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c.60, s. 37(2) (Eng.). This enactment confirmed
a decisive shift in English law’s conception of the legitimate purposes of custodial interro-
gation. As one commentary observed: “[PACE] embodied the philosophy of encouraging the
use of detention as an instrument for the obtaining of evidence by questioning. Thus, the very
reason why 98 per cent of defendants who are charged are arrested is in order that they can
be interrogated.” DAVIDWOLCHOVER&ANTHONY HEATON-ARMSTRONG,WOLCHOVER AND
HEATON-ARMSTRONG ON CONFESSION EVIDENCE 137 (1996).
203 So-called “safety interviews” intended “to prevent or minimise harm or loss to some
other person, or the public” are permitted. PACE Code C, supra note 56, 16.5.
An interview process which, so far as possible, enables the police to pro-
tect the public is a necessary imperative. These interviews are variously
described as “safety interviews”, or “urgent” or “emergency interviews”.
The suspect is interviewed for information which may help the police
to protect life and prevent serious damage to property to be obtained.
R v. Ibrahim [2008] EWCA Crim 880, [2009] 1 WLR 578, [33].
204 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 16.5.
improper
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(PACE) Code H Revised Code of Practice in Connection with: The Detention, Treatment and
Questioning by Police Officers of Persons in Police Detention Under Section 41 of, and Schedule
8 to, the Terrorism Act 2000—The Treatment and Questioning by Police Officers of Detained
Persons in Respect of Whom an Authorization to Question After Charge Has Been Given
Under Section 22 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
R v. Chetty
R v. Roper
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of the particular case at issue.”211 The issue of unfairly obtained evidence often in-
tersects with police questioning and the way in which police obtain a statement from
a suspect. When deciding whether a statement was obtained unfairly, section 30(6)
specifically requires judges to take into account the guidelines set out in the Practice
Note.212 These guidelines emphasize that a person must be advised that she is en-
titled to seek a lawyer’s advice and is not compelled to answer questions.
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
Only two types of interrogations categorically qualify. Looking first to the issue
of Miranda warnings, a complete failure to give the warnings would be improper,
but not illegal. “Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of
compulsion,” requiring that “unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . be excluded from evidence.”213 But
even here, there are exceptions, as discussed above.
When the question is one of voluntariness, where the police use acts of physical
violence or threats of violence during interrogation, the interrogation would be both
improper and illegal.
Physical violence or threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner
during detention serves no lawful purpose, invalidates confes-
sions that otherwise would be convincing, and is universally
condemned by the law. When present, there is no need to weigh
or measure its effects on the will of the individual victim. . . .
[J]udges long ago found it necessary to guard against miscar-
riages of justice by treating any confession made concurrently
with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy to be
received as evidence of guilt.214
These decisions did not eliminate police violence. A number of surveys con-
ducted between 2002 and 2008 show that, compared to white individuals, Hispanic
individuals were up to twice as likely and Black individuals up to three times as
likely “to experience physical force or its threat during their most recent contact
with the police.”215 And after decades of litigation, we now know that between 1972
211 R v. Wichman [2015] NZSC 198 at [503] (N.Z.).
212 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(6).
213 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
214 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953).
215 Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the Criminal
Justice System, SENTENCING PROJECT (2015), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publica
tions/black-lives-matter-eliminating-racial-inequity-in-the-criminal-justice-system/ [https://
perma.cc/DH85-87BZ]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NJC
242937, SPECIAL REPORT: POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011
(Oct. 2016).
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and 1991, Chicago law enforcement used abhorrent torture methods to elicit confes-
sions from at least 120 mostly Black individuals.216
Techniques short of physical force intended to exhaust suspects physically and
mentally may also amount to coercion, but the results in those cases are impossible
to categorize because they are so fact specific. In Davis v. North Carolina, for ex-
ample, the Court condemned tactics such as lengthy interrogation sessions (in that
case consisting of sixteen days of incommunicado questioning).217 Other cases reject
tactics such as prolonged detention combined with repeated questioning.218
One technique that seems especially offensive to the courts is lying about the
legal process itself. Lynumn v. Illinois, is illustrative.219 There the officers told the
suspect that if she did not confess, her government benefits would be withdrawn and
her children would be taken from her. The Court concluded: “We think it clear that
a confession made under such circumstances must be deemed not voluntary, but co-
erced.”220 Nonetheless, casebooks are filled with decisions following Lynumn uphold-
ing confessions made after promises of lenient treatment, as in Fare v. Michael C.,
where the young suspect was told “a cooperative attitude would be to [his] benefit.”221
Although tactics not involving either physical or mental exhaustion, taken alone,
are generally insufficient to show involuntariness, courts must also weigh those tactics
and the location of the interrogation against the vulnerabilities of the suspect.222 In the
Dassey case mentioned earlier, the court listed a number of relevant factors, includ-
ing “the suspect’s age, intelligence, and education, as well as his familiarity with the
criminal justice system,” and noted: “The interaction between the suspect’s vulnerabili-
ties and the police tactics may signal coercion even in the absence of physical coercion
or threats.”223 Spano v. New York is a good example of such an interaction. There,
a prolonged interrogation combined with the defendant’s personal characteristics and
the false claims by a fellow officer who was defendant’s childhood friend that he
needed the defendant to confess or his job and family would suffer terrible conse-
quences, violated due process.224
216 The court in United States v. Burge described the torture this way: “Former Chicago Police
Commander Jon Burge presided over an interrogation regime where suspects were suffocated
with plastic bags, electrocuted until they lost consciousness, held down against radiators, and
had loaded guns pointed at their heads during rounds of Russian roulette.” 711 F.3d 803, 806
(7th Cir. 2013).
217 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966).
218 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1959).
219 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
220 Id.
221 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979).
222 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
223 Dassey v. Dittman, 877 F.3d 297, 304 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2677
(2018).
224 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1959).
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No technique can be improper without police coercion. In Colorado v. Connelly,
the Court emphasized the need for a link between the suspect’s state of mind and the
actions of the police. Lacking that link, even where a suspect was experiencing
“command hallucinations,” the resulting confession was found to be admissible because
there was no causal connection between the police conduct and the confession.225
II. REMEDIES
A. If police conduct an improper interrogation, will the resulting confession be
excluded at trial?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
In the jurisdictions where there has been no modification of the common law,
if the impropriety results in a confession that is not voluntary, the confession will be
excluded at trial. In those jurisdictions, if the confession is ruled to have been volun-
tary, it may still be excluded in the exercise of discretion, on the bases I outlined
above. The potential for the confession to be unreliable when improper methods have
been used is important, but not the only relevant factor in considering discretionary
exclusion. It has been observed that “it is not always possible to treat voluntariness,
reliability, unfairness to the accused and public policy considerations as discrete
issues.”226 The differentiation is important, however, in that involuntariness will re-
sult in strict exclusion, whereas discretionary bases require the accused to satisfy the
court on the balance of probabilities that the evidence ought to be excluded.
The unfairness discretion is concerned with whether admitting the evidence would
be unfair to the accused at trial, rather than whether the police engaged in unfair
treatment of the accused when the confession was obtained.227
The third basis for discretionary exclusion, namely that the probative value of
the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (that is, the potential to lead the
jury into improper reasoning about the accused’s guilt), depends, in the case of a con-
fession, on the likelihood that it is not reliable, as that is the only factor that could
reduce its probative value to a level where the potential for prejudice becomes relevant.
In most cases, an impropriety that is not sufficient to render a confession legally
inadmissible will be unlikely to render a confession unreliable to the extent that the
third head of discretion would be engaged.
225 479 U.S. 157, 161–62, 164 (1986).
226 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 197 (Austl.) (in which Toohey, Gaudron, and
Gummow JJ said that it may be expected that “improprieties calculated to cause the making
of an untrue admission . . . . will often impact on the exercise of a free choice to speak if that
notion is given its full effect. However, it will not necessarily be so in every case.”).
227 Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10, 26 (Austl.).
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All of the Australian jurisdictions have legislation the effect of which is to exclude
evidence, including confessional evidence, where there has been noncompliance by
relevant authorities with a requirement of the legislation, unless the court decides
otherwise, having regard to various factors which lead to satisfaction that it is in the
interests of justice to admit the evidence.228 There are usually separate provisions, with
which I will deal in a later section, that require admissions to be video recorded and
deal with the admissibility of admissions that do not comply with that requirement.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
It is not uncommon for a statement to be challenged both on common law and
constitutional grounds. While the issues are related, and the evidence often identical,
the doctrines engage different burdens and standards of proof.
At common law, the prosecution bears the onus of proving a statement to be
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt—one of the few situations in which the crimi-
nal standard of proof is applied to a single piece of evidence. If a statement is found
to be involuntary, it is automatically excluded.
Where the defence alleges a Charter violation, the accused bears the persuasive
onus on a civil standard of proof. The accused must: 1) establish the Charter vio-
lation on a balance of probabilities; and 2) must establish that the admission of the
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The Charter does not guarantee a remedy for every rights violation. Admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the Charter is governed by section 24 of the
Charter which provides:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Char-
ter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-
cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.229
228 By way of example, see section 154(2) of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (CIA) in
Western Australia which lays out in some detail rules as to the admission of such evidence.
Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 154(2) (Austl.). The Act further provides that “[t]he
court may nevertheless decide to admit the evidence if it is satisfied that the desirability of admit-
ting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting the evidence,” having regard to
a number of specified factors and “any other matter the court thinks fit.” Id. s 155(2)–(3)(f).
229 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 24 (1)–(2), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
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These words have generated decades of litigation and have been given differing
interpretations over the years. The current iteration of the section 24(2) test was set
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2009 in R. v. Grant.230 In brief, the Court must
consider the seriousness of the state infringing conduct; the impact of the breach on
the suspect’s rights; and the societal interest in the prosecution of crime. Statements
obtained following a violation of the right to counsel are, as a general rule, excluded
due to the seriousness of the breach and the fact that the accused was conscripted to
manufacture evidence against himself. This raises serious concerns about self-incrimi-
nation and the fairness of the trial. Courts will not speculate on what advice a suspect
would have received absent the breach. There are some cases in which a statement
made after a section 10(b) breach was admitted. This may occur where the suspect
had an “irresistible desire to confess,”231 but such cases are very rare.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
The traditional common law rationale for excluding “involuntary” confessions was
pithily summarized by Lord Griffiths: “[T]he rejection of an improperly obtained
confession is not dependent only upon possible unreliability but also upon the principle
that a man cannot be compelled to incriminate himself and upon the importance that
attaches in a civilised society to proper behaviour by the police towards those in
their custody.”232
The old common law admissibility standard was superseded and replaced by
section 76 of PACE 1984. Subsection 76(1) provides that: “In any proceedings a con-
fession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so far
as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the
court in pursuance of this section.”233
The principal grounds of exclusion are then adumbrated by subsection 76(2):
If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in
evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is repre-
sented to the court that the confession was or may have been
obtained—
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely,
in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unre-
liable any confession which might be made by him in
consequence thereof,
230 2009 SCC 32 para. 71, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, 393–94 (Can.).
231 See R. v. Harper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343, 346 (Can.).
232 Lam Chi-ming v. R [1991] 2 AC 212 (PC) 220.
233 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, s. 76(1) (Eng.).
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the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence
against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court
beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding
that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.234
It is a measure of how seriously Parliament takes the responsibility of monitoring
the quality of confession evidence that the onus is placed squarely on the prosecu-
tion to disprove “beyond reasonable doubt” any objection to the admissibility of a
confession under either paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2).235
The Court of Appeal’s early decision in Fulling236 remains one of the leading
judicial pronouncements on the meaning of “oppression” under section 76(2)(a) of
PACE. According to Lord Lane CJ, section 76(2)(a)’s concept of oppression bears
its ordinary dictionary meaning:
The Oxford English Dictionary as its third definition of the word
runs as follows: “Exercise of authority or power in a burdensome,
harsh, or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects,
inferiors, etc., [or] the imposition of unreasonable or unjust bur-
dens.” One of the quotations given under that paragraph runs as
follows: “There is not a word in our language which expresses
more detestable wickedness than oppression.”237
Subsequent authorities have interpreted section 76(2)(a) more expansively. In Paris,
Abdullahi and Miller238 (the “Cardiff Three”), the suspect Miller was interrogated
over some thirteen hours, during which time he denied the murder no less than 300
times, before he finally confessed. Lord Taylor CJ seemed genuinely shocked by the
audiotaped record of the interview, exclaiming that “[s]hort of physical violence, it
is hard to conceive of a more hostile and intimidating approach by officers to a
suspect.”239 At the other end of the spectrum, an officer’s isolated shouting, swear-
ing, or fleeting loss of temper would not amount to oppression,240 nor does every
police impropriety automatically trigger exclusion.241 The maturity, mental stability,
234 Id. s. 76(2). Section 76(8) provides that: “‘[O]ppression’ includes torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture).”
235 Id. s. 76(2).
236 R v. Fulling [1987] QB 426 (CA) (Eng.).
237 Id. at 432.
238 R v. Paris, Abdullahi & Miller (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 99 (CA) 102 (Eng.).
239 Id. at 103.
240 R v. Emmerson (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 284 (CA) 284–85 (Eng.); R v. Heaton [1993] Crim.
L. Rev. 593 (CA) 595 (Eng.); see also Hussein v. Defence Secretary [2013] EWHC (Admin) 95,
[38] (shouting at military captives not inhuman, and unlikely to be considered “oppressive”).
241 R v. Parker [1995] Crim. L. Rev. 233 (CA) 234 (specifically applying the more general
principle established in cases such as R v. Keenan [1990] 2 QB 54 (CA) 69 (Eng.)).
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and physical health of the suspect,242 as well as the conduct of the interviewing
officers themselves, must all be taken into account in arriving at an intensively fact-
sensitive assessment.
The second limb of section 76(2) targets, not the unreliability of any particular
confession, but circumstances liable to produce unreliable admissions (even if the
confession in the instant case is or might well be true).243 The test is one of—as it
were—hypothetical unreliability:
[T]he test is not whether the actual confession was untruthful or
inaccurate. It is whether whatever was said or done was, in the
circumstances existing as at the time of the confession, likely to
have rendered such a confession unreliable, whether or not it may
be seen subsequently (with hindsight and in the light of all the
material available at trial) that it did or did not actually do so.244
Section 76(2)(b) is predicated on the assumption that a categorical rule of exclusion
will promote the reliability of confession evidence in general, in preference to a
discretionary approach relying on case-specific judicial determinations and ad hoc
exceptions. The reliability of particular admissions is not treated as a criterion of
admissibility in its own right. Contextual applications of subsection (2)(b) must focus
on the interaction between particular suspects and the nature and conditions of the
police interview or other occasion on which an admission was made. “The question
is always fact specific, and in particular, defendant specific . . . . The focus must be
concentrated on the reliability of the confession made by the individual defendant,
given the circumstances as they existed when the confession was made.”245 In contrast
to the “oppression” ground of exclusion, however, the operation of the unreliability
limb does not presuppose any impropriety on the part of the police.246 Some dis-
turbed or dissociated suspects247 may be prone to making false admissions in the
absence of any untoward pressure or encouragement to incriminate themselves.248
242 See, e.g., R v. Seelig [1992] 1 WLR 148 (CA) 155 (Eng.); R v. Smith (Wallace Duncan)
(1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 233 (CA) 238 (Eng.).
243 See Re Proulx [2001] 1 All ER 57 (DC) (Eng.).
244 Id. at 77.
245 R v. Wahab [2002] EWCA Crim 1570 [40], [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 15, 241 (Eng.).
246 Beeres v. CPS [2014] EWHC (Admin) 283, [10], [2014] 2 Cr. App. R. 8 101, 107 (“The
absence of culpability on the part of the police is not determinative since a confession may prove
to be unreliable notwithstanding.”).
247 See, e.g., R v. Ward (Judith) [1993] 1 WLR 619 (CA) 674 (Eng.); R v. Brady [2004]
EWCA Crim 2230, [1], [17] (Eng.) (described by Laws LJ as an “extraordinary” and “trouble-
some” case in which the accused’s conviction of robbery, to which she confessed and pleaded
guilty, was only quashed when two independent eyewitnesses came forward to say that she
had been misidentified as the robber).
248 “[S]ometimes all is not what it seems. The question . . . is one of objective evaluation.”
R v. Wilding [2010] EWCA Crim 2799, [21] (Gross LJ) (Eng.); see also R v. Roberts [2011]
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NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
New Zealand courts have long claimed jurisdiction to exclude improperly ob-
tained evidence.249 Initially, exclusion was on the basis of trial fairness. Following the
enactment of the NZBORA, the courts began excluding evidence obtained in breach
of the rights enshrined therein and shifted towards a presumption in favour of ex-
clusion. However, the Court of Appeal replaced this approach with a balancing test
focusing on whether exclusion of the improperly obtained evidence was a propor-
tionate remedy to the impropriety giving rise to the evidence.250 This approach has
largely been codified in section 30 of the Evidence Act which requires a balancing
exercise in light of a non-exhaustive list of factors in section 30(3):
(a) the importance of any right breached by the impropriety and
the seriousness of the intrusion on it:
(b) the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether it was
deliberate, reckless, or done in bad faith:
(c) the nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence:
(d) the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is
charged:
(e) whether there were any other investigatory techniques not
involving any breach of the rights that were known to be
available but were not used:
(f) whether there are alternative remedies to exclusion of the evi-
dence that can adequately provide redress to the defendant:
(g) whether the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended
physical danger to the Police or others:
(h) whether there was any urgency in obtaining the improperly
obtained evidence.251
The New Zealand approach neither mandates the exclusion of evidence nor creates
a presumption in its favour. It simply maintains the balancing test where exclusion
will only be ordered where it is deemed a proportionate response to the impropriety
having regard to the need for an effective and credible justice system.252
EWCA Crim 2974, [17] (Goldring LJ) (Eng.) (referring to “the objective likelihood of relia-
bility in the circumstances at the time the confession was made”).
249 See generally Simon France, Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence, 11 N.Z.
UNIVS. L. REV. 334 (1985).
250 See generally R v. Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (N.Z.).
251 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3) (N.Z.).
252 The Law Commission in the Second Review of the Evidence Act noted that the general
policy of section 30 should be examined given common concerns that the section is skewed
too heavily in favor of admission rather than exclusion. N.Z. Law Comm’n, The Second Review
of the Evidence Act 2006 [2019] NZLCR 142: Te Arotake Tuarua I te Evidence Act 2006,
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In addition to section 30, the reliability rule and the oppression rule in sections
28 and 29 of the Evidence Act 2006 provide further means of control over the ad-
missibility of statements obtained through questionable investigative methods.253
Unlike section 30 which leaves an overarching discretion with the judge as whether
or not evidence ought to be excluded, sections 28 and 29 are both rules of automatic
exclusion: once the conditions in either of those sections are made out, the evidence
simply must be excluded.254
The reliability rule in section 28 focuses on the circumstances in which the
statement offered by the prosecution was made. If the defendant or the judge makes
reliability a live issue on the basis of an evidential foundation, the statement must
be excluded unless the prosecution proves on the balance of probabilities that the
circumstances in which the statement was made were not likely to have adversely
affected its reliability.255
Section 29 operates to exclude statements that are influenced by oppression.256
If the defendant or the judge makes oppression a live issue, then the prosecution
must satisfy the judge beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was not influ-
enced by oppression.257
NZLII, s 7.5, http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/lawreform/NZLCR/2019/142.html [https://perma
.cc/B4MQ-87Z5] (Mar. 13, 2019).
253 Evidence Act 2006, ss 28–29.
254 Id.
255 When making the reliability assessment, the judge must have regard to the non-exhaustive
list of matters in section 28(4) including the defendant’s physical, mental or psychological
condition at the time the statement was made; any mental, intellectual or physical disability
to which the defendant is subject; the nature of any questions and manner and circumstances
in which they were put to the defendant; and the nature of any threat, promise or representa-
tion made to the defendant or any other person. Id. s 28(4). Section 28(3) provides a limited
exception and that is when a statement is offered only as evidence of the physical, mental or
psychological condition of the defendant or as evidence of the fact the statement was made,
as opposed to for the proof of its content. Id. s 28(3).
In one recent case, the defendant argued that her statement should be inadmissible under
section 28 due to a combination of extreme tiredness and the effects of cannabis and alcohol.
R v. Butler [2019] NZHC 446 at [33] (N.Z.). The court accepted that the issue of reliability
was a live issue, but held that the defendant’s tiredness and any enduring effects of alcohol
or cannabis at the time of her police interviews were not likely to have adversely affected the
reliability of her statement. Id. The court noted the absence of any case law or social science
research to assist with her decision and considered a “common sense” approach to be most
appropriate. Id. at [21].
256 Evidence Act 2006, s 29.
257 Section 29(5) provides an exhaustive definition of oppression as “oppressive, violent, in-
human, or degrading conduct towards, or treatment of, the defendant or another person; or . . .
a threat of conduct or treatment of that kind.” Id. In R v. Hanford, Priestley J stated that the words
in section 29(5) “denote conduct of a very brutal, physically violent, or highly callous type.”
HC Auckland CRI 2007-057-1922, 24 July 2008 at [64] (N.Z.).
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Sections 28–30 will often overlap and intersect. In one prominent decision, the
Supreme Court reviewed the reform process leading to sections 28–30 of the Act:
In our view, the legislative scheme reveals a three tier approach
to confessional statements:
(a) At the most serious level are statements obtained under
the influence of oppression. . . .
(b) The second tier concerns reliability. . . . The change in the
standard of proof [of ss 28(2); 29(2)] is indicative of reliability
issues being regarded as less serious than oppressive conduct. . . .
(c) If neither s 28 nor s 29 apply, the statement falls for con-
sideration under the more general provisions of s 30. . . . If the
statement is found to have been improperly obtained (for s 30
purposes) there is no onus on the Crown to demonstrate that the
circumstances require admission of the statement. Rather, the
circumstances in which the confessional statement was obtained
becomes one of the number of balancing factors set out in s 30(3)
to be taken into account in determining whether the statement
should be admitted.258
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
If police conduct an improper interrogation, it is difficult to determine if the
resulting confession will be excluded at trial. It depends on the circumstances. Due
process, however, prohibits coerced confessions from being used in any way in a
criminal trial.259
As a general rule, that is also true for voluntary confessions given in violation of
Miranda, as the Court made clear in Oregon v. Elstad, discussed above.260 However,
as we have seen, there are exceptions to this rule.
B. Will tangible evidence be excluded if the statement is not allowed?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
The answer is “not necessarily.” There is no strict rule of exclusion of “the fruit
of the poisoned tree” in the common law applied in Australia.
The public policy basis for discretionary exclusion was first expounded in
Australia in Bunning v Cross, a case concerning the administering of a breathalyser
test in contravention of the relevant statutory requirements.261 It was held that the
258 R v Hawea [2009] NZCA 127 at [31] (N.Z.) (citations omitted).
259 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
260 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
261 (1978) 141 CLR 54, 80–81 (Austl.). The court referred to the decision in R v Ireland,
(1970) 126 CLR 321, 335 (Austl.) which, in part, did involve a confession.
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court had a discretion at common law to exclude tangible evidence obtained by illegal
or improper process, which includes a failure to comply with statutory obligations,
although in the circumstances of that case the High Court held that the evidence ought
to have been admitted. I am not aware of any decision in Australia in which “tangible
evidence” has been excluded on the basis that the accused’s statement that identified
the existence or location of the object was excluded. However, it is within the prin-
ciples concerning discretionary exclusion (both in respect of fairness and public policy)
for an exhibit found in such circumstances to be excluded at trial if the interests of
justice favoured such a course. That decision would be reached after taking into
account the competing factors, in particular the desirability of bringing wrongdoers
to justice on the one hand and the damage to the integrity of the administration of
justice and law enforcement on the other.262
Provisions such as section 154(2) of the CIA (referred to above) render inadmis-
sible any evidence derived from the exercise of a power where there has been a
contravention of a relevant requirement of the Act.263 On the face of it, the provision
could apply to exclude (presumptively) tangible evidence of which the police became
aware only as a result of the accused’s admissions which have been excluded from evi-
dence. Such tangible evidence could be said to have been derived from the exercise of
the power to detain the suspect for the purposes of interviewing or investigation.264
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
This raises the question of derivative evidence.
For many years, the key question was whether the tangible evidence would have
been discovered but for the breach. For example, in R. v. Black, the accused was a
suspect in a homicide.265 While being questioned in her home, she produced the knife
that had been used to kill the victim from her kitchen drawer. While the police violated
the suspect’s right to counsel, and her statements were excluded, the Supreme Court
of Canada ruled that the knife was admissible at trial. There was no doubt that the
police would have conducted a search of the accused’s apartment with or without her
assistance and that such a search would have uncovered the knife. Because the evidence
was discoverable even without the statement, it was ruled admissible at the trial.
By way of contrast, in R. v. Burlingham, the murder weapon was excluded at
trial.266 Police engaged in highly improper and unconstitutional questioning tech-
niques of Mr. Burlingham before asking him to identify where the weapon was. He
262 See generally Ireland, 126 CLR 321; R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159 (Austl.). In
Ireland, Barwick CJ said: “Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be
obtained at too high a price.” Ireland, 126 CLR at 335.
263 Criminal Investigations Act 2006 (WA) s 154(2) (Austl.).
264 See id. s 139(2)(b)–(c).
265 See generally [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 (Can.).
266 See generally [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (Can.).
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eventually showed police where he had left the gun months earlier, under what had
since become the frozen Kootenay River. Armed with that information, police divers
located the gun for presentation at trial. In excluding the statements and the gun, the
Court noted that the gun would never have been found were it not for the unconstitu-
tional conduct by the police officers.
With the evolution of the section 24(2) test under R. v. Grant,267 discoverability
is no longer dispositive when dealing with derivative evidence. It is one of many
factors to be considered:
The weighing process and balancing of these concerns is one for
the trial judge in each case. Provided the judge has considered
the correct factors, considerable deference should be accorded to
his or her decision. As a general rule, however, it can be ventured
that where reliable evidence is discovered as a result of a good
faith infringement that did not greatly undermine the accused’s
protected interests, the trial judge may conclude that it should be
admitted under s. 24(2). On the other hand, deliberate and egre-
gious police conduct that severely impacted the accused’s pro-
tected interests may result in exclusion, notwithstanding that the
evidence may be reliable.
The s. 24(2) judge must remain sensitive to the concern that
a more flexible rule may encourage police to improperly obtain
statements that they know will be inadmissible, in order to find
derivative evidence which they believe may be admissible. The
judge should refuse to admit evidence where there is reason to be-
lieve the police deliberately abused their power to obtain a state-
ment which might lead them to such evidence. Where derivative
evidence is obtained by way of a deliberate or flagrant Charter
breach, its admission would bring the administration of justice
into further disrepute and the evidence should be excluded.268
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
English law has never embraced a general “fruit of the poisoned tree” doctrine
mandating exclusion of evidence obtained through a tainted confession or any other
kind of illegality or impropriety. The traditional common law rule, stretching back
at least to the mid-eighteenth century, is that the admissibility of evidence at trial is
wholly unaffected by the circumstances in which it was obtained.269 By the same token,
267 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (Can.).
268 Id. paras. 127–28.
269 Classic early authorities include R v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234; 1 Leach 263;
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choice not to exercise a right in a particular case.306 A waiver by silence was held to
have occurred in Ballantyne because the defendant had been fully informed of and
understood his right to speak to a lawyer.307 The court emphasized that although a
decision not to exercise the right to speak to a lawyer should not be lightly inferred,
that does not mean it may never be inferred. Whilst it would constitute best practice,
there is no requirement for a police officer to expressly enquire whether a suspect
wishes to exercise the right to consult with a lawyer.
The key Supreme Court decision is R v. Perry.308 There the defendant had not
unequivocally claimed the right to remain silent by telling the police that he had
spoken to his lawyer by telephone and the lawyer had told him not to make a state-
ment.309 The defendant’s rights were explained to him, but he elected to start an
interview. During the interview he said, “I’m not going to say anymore until I speak
with a lawyer.”310 The officer stopped the interview and provided access to a lawyer.
The defendant then told the detective his lawyer had advised him not to make a
statement. During a break, the officer suggested to the defendant that his choice not
to continue his statement might not be his best course. The Supreme Court found
that the defendant had not unequivocally asserted a wish to remain silent and was
undecided about whether or not to say anything further.311
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
According to Miranda:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure
is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the in-
terrogation must cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
306 See [2017] NZCA 363 at [34] (N.Z.). See generally Police v. Kohler [1993] 3 NZLR
129 (N.Z.).
307 Ballantyne, [2017] NZCA 363 at [34].
308 See [2016] NZSC 102 at [36]–[37] (N.Z.).
309 Id.
310 Id. at [13].
311 Given the conclusion in Perry, the majority held that the case was not the appropriate
context in which to resolve the divergence in the Court of Appeal on a related issue of whether
the police must stop questioning after an assertion of a desire to exercise the right to silence or
to a lawyer. Id. at [159]. Following a series of cases in which the Court came close to recognizing
such a requirement, it rejected such a “bright line” rule in R v. Ormsby CA 493/04, 8 April 2005
(N.Z.). In Ormsby the Court held that, despite clause 2 of the Practice Note, where a suspect
has expressed a desire to remain silent, the police may continue to ask further questions in the
hope that the suspect will waive their right to silence, provided the questioning is not “overbear-
ing or unfair.” Id. This would ultimately involve a finding of fact as to whether or not contin-
uation of the questioning involved an “inappropriate undermining” of the suspect’s rights under
NZBORA. See id.
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present. . . . If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent.312
Despite the clarity of this language, a suspect still has to speak up. Silence during
a three-hour interrogation does not constitute a request for silence. To invoke the
right, a suspect must say he or she wants to remain silent or does not want to talk.313
Similarly, a statement like, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” does not consti-
tute a request for a lawyer.314 Although a suspect need not “speak with the discrimi-
nation of an Oxford don,”315 a request for counsel “requires, at a minimum, some
statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney.”316 “[T]he likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to
be present is not the test . . . .”317
Once suspects have invoked their right to counsel, further questioning must
cease unless they knowingly and intelligently waive their right. The question then
becomes, how to determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent? Again,
courts look to the totality of the circumstances:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.318
In Fare v. Michael C., the analysis included the “juvenile’s age, experience, educa-
tion, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to under-
stand the warnings given him . . . and the consequences of waiving those rights.”319
Although the Court there described the government’s burden as “heavy,”320 the
Court later lowered the standard to “preponderance of the evidence.”321
The government met that standard in one important case where the defendant
originally said he did not want to answer any more questions and all questioning
stopped. Two hours later, when different detectives gave new warnings at a different
312 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966).
313 See generally, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
314 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994).
315 Id. at 476 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
316 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
317 Id.
318 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
319 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
320 Id. at 724.
321 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
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location and questioned the defendant about a different crime, the Court found no
Miranda violation.322 The differences made all the difference.
Waiver may also be inferred. In North Carolina v. Butler, the defendant was
read his rights, said he understood them, but refused to sign the waiver form.323 The
agents explained he did not need to sign the form and then asked to talk with him.324
The Court found the defendant’s subsequent inculpatory statements were voluntary
and that he had properly waived his Miranda rights.325
B. When [if ever] are statements, ruled admissible, edited before presentation to
a jury?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
By virtue of statutory requirement (which will be discussed later), statements
made by an accused person will almost invariably be recorded by electronic audio-
visual means (video recording). However, whether the statement is a video record-
ing or written, admissible statements are routinely edited before presentation to a
jury (and also in judge alone trials) to remove inadmissible or otherwise irrelevant
matter, particularly if it could be prejudicial to the accused. Such material should not
be admitted before a jury, and therefore should be excised.326
Generally, in cases of charges for serious offences, there are statutory provisions
to the effect that, subject to exceptions, evidence of a confession or admission by an ac-
cused is not admissible unless it is a video (or audio-visual) recording. The editing
of such recordings to remove inadmissible or irrelevant material will ordinarily be done
by agreement between the prosecution and defence, either at the instigation of the
prosecution or upon request (with suggested edits) by the defence. The court may
give directions (with or without conditions) as to the editing of an electronically
recorded interview.327 That may occur as a result of a decision upon a dispute between
the parties as to what edits should be made or because of matters the court has
identified as inadmissible at a hearing before trial.
Edits will often be obvious, with a “jump” in the video and audio and a break
in the flow of the questioning or an answer, so juries are directed that editing is a
routine matter to remove irrelevant material and that they are not to draw any ad-
verse conclusion against the accused (or, it may be added, the prosecution) as a result.
If the editing results in distortion of the interview or unfairness to the accused, it
may be excluded by the court in the exercise of discretion.328
322 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U S. 96, 104–05, 107 (1975).
323 441 U.S. 369, 371, 373, 375–76 (1979).
324 Id. at 371.
325 Id. at 375–76.
326 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460, 473 (Austl.).
327 See, e.g., Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 122 (Austl.).
328 The issue was raised in R v Lacey, which involved a written record of interview, although
in that case, the interview was held to have been properly admitted. (1982) 29 SASR 525, 538
(Austl.) (en banc).
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Examples of material that would be edited out include references by the accused
to previous convictions for offending and/or periods of imprisonment, questions and
answers concerning matters that are not the subject of the charges faced by the
accused at trial, opinions or expressions of disbelief expressed by the interviewing
officers, lengthy recitations by the interviewing officers of the evidence of other
witnesses that are not adopted by the accused, “no comment” answers, and gratu-
itous or scandalous comments made by an accused about a victim or a witness that
are not relevant to his or her defence. There is a tendency to delete “no comment”
answers on the basis that they are not probative and may engender prejudice against
the accused, notwithstanding any direction from the judge that the jury must not
draw any adverse inference from an accused’s exercise of the right to silence. There
is no doubt that an interview that consists only of “no comment” answers is not
admissible, as it contains no relevant evidence. However, when an accused exercises
his right to silence by answering in that way to some of the questions, but gives
relevant answers to other questions, it is not strictly necessary for the “no comment”
answers to be excised, provided an appropriate direction is given to the jury. It will
be a matter of judgment, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case,
whether particular edits are necessary.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
Statements are often edited, particularly when certain questioning techniques are
used. Police will sometimes engage in “forensic soliloquys” during interviews, offering
their theories in the hopes that the suspect might take the bait. The theories of the
officer should not be heard by the trier of fact unless they are adopted by the suspect.
Similarly, where the accused has asserted his desire to remain silent, this too is
usually edited out of the statement, the concern being that a jury might think the
accused had something to hide. An individual should never be penalized for asserting
or exercising constitutional rights. If editing is not possible (for example, because
content is necessary to provide context for another utterance), then the jury must be
instructed that they are not to draw any adverse inference from the accused’s invo-
cation of the right to silence during questioning by police.329
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
Editing of witness statements prior to their production in a trial is a routine, and
largely uncontroversial, feature of criminal litigation in England and Wales. The
accused’s pretrial statements, including confessions and informal admissions, are in
principle no different to the pretrial statements of any other declarant or witness in
this regard. Inadmissible material would be edited out as a matter of course.330
329 See generally R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (Can.).
330 Thus, tape recordings should not be given to juries after their retirement (as other exhibits
can be), because “[i]t may very well be that there are matters which are left on the tape inad-
vertently which the jury should not hear.” R v. Riaz (1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 339 at 344 (Eng.).
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suspect.372 Placement of an undercover cellmate is acceptable, if that individual pas-
sively receives information from the accused.
What about undercover operations that take place outside of the custodial context?
For many years, there were no protections afforded a suspect in this scenario. The
confessions rule only applied if the accused knew that he was speaking to a person
in authority. The whole point of an undercover operation is to conceal that fact.373
The rights under section 10(b) of the Charter and the section 7 right to silence are
only triggered once there is a detention. Suspects are not detained during undercover
operations. These doctrinal limitations made it difficult for the courts to remediate
unfairness flowing from certain evidence gathering methods.
One of the more notorious methods was the “Mr. Big” operation, whereby
undercover officers would befriend the suspect, invite him to join a criminal organi-
zation, tantalize him with promises of wealth and other benefits and gradually in-
filtrate his life. While there are variations on the theme, a Mr. Big operation would
eventually have the suspect meet with the kingpin of the criminal organization. That
individual would elicit a confession using one of various strategies. He might insist
on knowing about anything in the suspect’s background that could come back to
haunt him; he might ask the suspect to prove his capacity and willingness to commit
criminal acts; or he might tell the suspect that if he had a crime in the past, the
organization could fix it, because they had police officers on the inside. Faced with
these inducements, suspects may make highly incriminating statements.
Mr. Big poses many difficulties. For one thing, it is not clear that the statements
produced by this method are reliable. It is conceivable that a suspect intent on joining
the group might say something untrue in order to guarantee membership. The techn-
ique is, in some cases, so invasive and oppressive as to be abusive. Vulnerable and/or
isolated suspects, who are financially underprivileged, may be wooed with offers of
friendship, untold wealth, and other temptations. Finally, if the suspect seeks to
challenge the statement at trial, he must disclose that he wanted to join a criminal
organization, a fact that is, itself, highly prejudicial in front of a jury.
The landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hart addressed
these problems head-on.374 The court fashioned a new common law rule to deal with
the Mr. Big scenario. The court ruled that, where the state recruits an accused into
a fictitious criminal organization and seeks to elicit a confession from him, any
confession made by the accused to the state during the operation is presumptively
inadmissible.375 This presumption of inadmissibility is only overcome if two prongs
of the test are met. First, the Crown must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that
the probative value of the confession outweighs its prejudicial effect. The question
for the trial judge is whether, and to what extent, the reliability of the confession has
372 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 155 (Can.).
373 R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, para. 40, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, 40 (Can.).
374 2014 SCC 52, para. 10, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544, 559 (Can.).
375 Id. para. 13.
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been called into doubt by the circumstances in which it was made. If the first prong is
met, the inquiry then turns to the second prong, which explores whether the opera-
tion amounted to an abuse of process. Here the court will consider, among other
things, the extent to which police have preyed on an accused’s vulnerabilities, such
as mental health problems, substance addictions, or youthfulness. In Hart, the new
rule led to exclusion of the confessions made by the accused.376
The decision in Hart was an important development in Canadian law, one whose
potential has yet to be fully realized. The principles in Hart have logical application
outside of the Mr. Big context. In theory, the approach might apply to other police
strategies that carry a risk of producing unreliable evidence. Similarly, the rule shines
a spotlight on the scope of undercover operations and the extent to which police
have infiltrated or exploited a suspect’s lifestyle. The focus on reliability and abuse
of process as part of the admissibility equation can, more generally, help to reduce
the risks of wrongful conviction.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
The controlling provision in England and Wales is Police and Criminal Evidence
Act (PACE) 1984, section 78, empowering trial judges to exclude evidence adduced
by the prosecution in circumstances where it would be manifestly unfair to admit it.
In cases of serious police illegality or impropriety sapping the integrity of criminal
proceedings, infringing human rights, and undermining the rule of law, trial courts
may, alternatively, stay proceedings indefinitely as an abuse of process.377
The PACE Code C regime for regulating custodial interviews with suspects is
plainly incompatible with the pragmatic requirements of successful undercover
operations, not least the imperative of keeping officers’ real identities and investiga-
tive purposes secret. English law resolves this tension, in effect, through its definition
of an interview. So long as undercover officers are acting “in role” for the purpose
of evidence-gathering, they remain outside the PACE interview framework, and any
admissions—or other incriminating conduct—by suspects will, in principle, be ad-
missible at trial. But as soon as officers have enough information to charge particular
suspects with an offence, they should generally make an arrest and “read suspects
their rights” (subject to considerations of personal safety, etc.). If a court discerns that
an officer has remained “in character” longer than reasonably necessary, effectively
exploiting their undercover status in order to conduct a PACE-preempting covert
interrogation aimed at securing additional evidence to build up a case, any resultant
admissions are liable to be excluded at trial under section 78.
376 Id. paras. 89–93.
377 See Tony Ward & Clare Leon, Excluding Evidence (or Staying Proceedings) to Vindicate
Rights in Irish and English Law, 35 LEGAL STUD. 571 (2015); Kingsley Hyland & Clive Walker,
Undercover Policing and Underwhelming Laws, 2014 CRIM. L. REV. 555; David Ormerod &
Andrew Roberts, The Trouble with Teixeira: Developing a Principled Approach to Entrapment,
6 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 38 (2002).
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The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Christou and Wright378 remains a primary
reference point in a voluminous jurisprudence.379 The police set up fake premises—
‘Stardust Jewellers’—in order to flush out thieves, burglars, and handlers of stolen
goods suspected to be operating in the area. All transactions were captured on video-
tape by hidden cameras, providing conclusive evidence of customers’ statements.
On appeal, the defence argued that this undercover operation had deprived the
accused of the privilege against self-incrimination, and had involved a catalogue of
breaches of PACE Code C; the entire operation was irremediably unfair, and any
evidence arising from it should consequently be excluded under section 78. The
court ruled these complaints entirely misconceived.380 Code C was never intended
to apply, and did not apply, to undercover operations such as this: “The appellants
were not being questioned by police officers acting as such. Conversation was on
equal terms. There could be no question of pressure or intimidation . . . .”381 So long
as the officers were doing no more than was required to sustain the fiction of their
assumed roles, the operation was legitimate and could not be denounced as a cynical
subversion of the PACE regime governing formal police interviews:
[T]he trick was not applied to the appellants; they voluntarily ap-
plied themselves to the trick. It is not every trick producing evi-
dence against an accused which results in unfairness. There are, in
criminal investigations, a number of situations in which the police
adopt ruses or tricks in the public interest to obtain evidence.382
In other cases, by contrast, the police have gone too far in probing for further in-
criminating information after the point at which an arrest should have been made,383
occasionally resulting in convictions being quashed. Exclusion is all the more likely
in the absence of a reliable recording of alleged admissions.384
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
Within the context of interrogation, “undercover operations” encompasses a
spectrum of investigative tactics used by police with a view to obtaining admissions.
Such methods include:
378 See R v. Christou & Wright [1992] QB 979; (1992) Cr. App. R. 264 (CA) (Eng.).
379 See R v. Palmer [2014] EWCA Crim 1681, [6], [12] (Eng.) (almost identical “sting”
employing a fake pawn shop in Barnet, “TJ’s Trading Post,” resulting in 118 prosecutions and
the recovery of 2,360 stolen items “including jewellery, electrical equipment, 541 passports,
334 driving licences, and 357 bank cards”).
380 See R v. Christou & Wright [1992] QB 979.
381 Id. at 991.
382 Id. at 989.
383 See R v. Okafor (1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 97 (CA) (Eng.); cf. R v. Whiteley [2005]
EWCA Crim 699 (Eng.).
384 See R v. Bryce (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 320 (CA) 321 (Eng.).
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1. situations in which the police record a conversation between the suspect
and a private person;
2. situations where a suspect is placed in overnight custody and under-
cover officers are deployed into the cell;
3. the Crime Scenario Undercover Technique, otherwise known as the
“Mr Big” scenario.
It is to the first situation, in which police suggest the recording, that a major court
decision noted that a traditional “but for” test is key.385 That is, would the exchange
between the accused and the complainant have taken place, in the form and manner
in which it did take place, but for the intervention of the state?386 The court there also
considered the nature of the exchange between the accused and the state agent to be
central.387 Factors such as whether the questioning was objectionable (was the
conversation the functional equivalent of an interrogation?) and the nature of the
relationship between the accused and the state agent (was there a relationship of
trust, vulnerability on the part of the accused or an element of emotional coercion
or manipulation?) will be taken into account.388
The second situation involves statements made to an undercover police officer
by a defendant in custody.389 In R v. Kumar,390 the defendant had been interviewed
at the police station on video record. His interview was terminated so that he could
obtain legal advice. He was then arrested for murder and placed in a police cell.
Unbeknown to the defendant, two undercover police officers were placed in the cell
with him and instigated conversation with him. As the defendant had been arrested
and was in custody, he was entitled to protection of his rights under sections 23(1)
and 23(4) of the NZBORA.391 Clearly his right to silence and right to counsel were
at risk of being undermined.
In assessing whether such rights had been undermined, the Court applied the
“active elicitation” test, examining both the nature of the exchange and the nature
of the relationship between the suspect and the undercover officer. It was held that the
undercover officers had directed their conversation in a way that “prompted, coaxed,
or cajoled” him to make the statements and had taken an approach that was the
“functional equivalent of interrogation.”392 It was accordingly concluded that the
385 R v. Barlow (1995) 14 CRNZ 9 (CA) at 23, 61 (N.Z.).
386 Id.
387 Id. at 23, 37, 53, 63.
388 Id. at 38, 53. Importantly, it was noted that if police deliberately delay charging the suspect
and orchestrate an interrogation in contravention of a suspect’s rights under the Practice Note on
Police Questioning, the statement is likely to be deemed inadmissible as evidence. Id. at 27, 31.
389 Typically at the police station.
390 [2015] NZSC 124 (N.Z.).
391 Id. at [128], [134].
392 Id. at [62]–[67].
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undercover officer had elicited the suspect’s confession and thus his right to silence had
been undermined, so his statements had been improperly obtained for the purposes of
section 30(5)(a).393 The statements were inadmissible following the balancing process.
The third situation, the Crime Scenario Undercover Technique, is often referred
to as the “Mr Big” technique. Here we see the execution of a sophisticated opera-
tion, likely spanning several months, where the target is drawn into what appears to
be a criminal organisation that is in fact made up of undercover police officers. The
final initiation test for admission to the organisation is a meeting with the head of
the organisation, “Mr Big,” where incriminating statements that will later be used
as prosecution evidence are likely to be made. By the time of the interview, the
suspect is aware that acceptance into the group will bring rewards such as money,
lifestyle, or loyalty from other members.
The leading case on the use of this type of investigative technique is R v.
Wichman.394 The defendant challenged the reliability of the confession made during
the final interview pursuant to section 28 of the Evidence Act and argued that it had
been improperly obtained pursuant to section 30.395 The majority, over a strong
dissent, held that the confession was reliable and the evidence had not been improp-
erly obtained.396 When determining reliability, both opinions considered the actual
reliability of the confession, by reference to other evidence, to be a factor to be taken
into account in the assessment.397
The majority of the Supreme Court admitted the defendant’s statements.398 Its
approach to the question of admissibility was informed by the view that sections 8,
28, 29 and 30 must all be interpreted in a coherent way.399 Section 29 excludes
statements “influenced by oppression” and so addresses impropriety by undercover
officers involving actual or threatened violence to obtain threats.400 Section 28 ad-
dresses the risk of unreliable confessions.401 Section 30 covers other improprieties
such as circumvention of the Practice Note.402
The Court highlighted the inadequacies of the haphazard manner in the way this
area of the law currently operates as follows:
The case by case approach which this Court must take in
relation to the appropriateness of particular police practices is
393 Id.
394 [2015] NZSC 198 (N.Z.).
395 See id. at [52].
396 See id. at [131], [144].
397 See id. at [84]; see also N.Z. Law Comm’n, supra note 252, s 6.19 (The Law Commission
in its second review of the Evidence Act considered this approach to be correct.).
398 See Wichman, [2015] NZSC 198 at [131].
399 See id. at [69].
400 See id. at [24].
401 See id. at [28].
402 See id. at [30].
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not well-suited to the establishment of general guidelines as to
the circumstances in which a particular investigatory technique
is deployed. It is of note that court sanction in the form of a
warrant is required for police investigations which are far less
intrusive than a Mr Big operation. Against that background there
may be some sense in devising a system (perhaps involving the
courts) under which criteria for the deployment of such tech-
niques are developed and perhaps for some form of supervision
(perhaps in the form of a warrant process) to ensure that such
considerations are properly weighed, where a proposed opera-
tion will be intrusive and may have damaging effects as far as
the suspect is concerned.403
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
Miranda warnings are not required during undercover operations unless and
until a suspect is taken into custody. Nor are they required if police ask (or send in)
a cellmate to elicit incriminating information from a defendant.404 Simply put, “Con-
versations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda.”405
Coerced confessions are a slightly different matter. Custody is no longer the
touchstone. Only in the rarest of circumstances would a suspect’s incriminating
statements made during an undercover operation be considered involuntary.
IV. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF THE INTERROGATION
A. Do different rules apply depending on the individual suspect? For instance,
what about suspects who are minors, not native speakers, or intellectually
disabled?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
There are statutory provisions in all jurisdictions that afford certain suspects
particular rights that are not available generally.
For instance, in respect to minors (persons under eighteen years of age), the
Commonwealth’s Crimes Act 1914 provides that an investigating official must not
question the suspect (whether under arrest or not) unless an interview friend is
403 Id. at [127]; see also N.Z. Law Comm’n, supra note 252, ss 6.38–6.46 (The Law Commis-
sion, in considering whether the Practice Note as currently drafted should apply to undercover
operations, concluded that that would be undesirable but left open the possibility of a new Prac-
tice Note following the completion of the consideration of the Search and Surveillance regime.).
404 See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298 (1990).
405 Id. at 296.
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present while the suspect is being questioned. Before the start of the questioning, the
official must allow the suspect to communicate with the interview friend in circum-
stances in which, as far as practicable, the communication will not be overheard.406
Similar provisions apply under that Act in respect of Aboriginal persons and Torres
Strait Islanders, with the additional requirement that a representative of an Aboriginal
legal assistance service must also be notified and given the opportunity to communicate
with the suspect before any questioning takes place.407 The Police Force Regulations
1979 require similar notification in Western Australia.
While there is no specific statutory provision in Western Australia for an in-
terview friend to be present when a minor is interviewed, the police must ensure that
a responsible adult has been notified of the intention to question the young person,408
and the Commissioner of Police has issued instructions requiring an interview friend
or independent person to be present.409 The Commissioner’s instructions, which
indicate that an interview with a juvenile may otherwise be found to be inadmissible
because it is not voluntary or on the basis of unfairness, reflect the likely outcome
of applying the common law principles if a challenge were made to such an inter-
view.410 In other words, while the same principles apply, the particular vulnerability
of minors will be a relevant consideration in determining voluntariness and whether
it would be unfair to receive any admissions into evidence. The same can be said of
persons who are intellectually disabled, although there is no specific statutory
provision relating to such persons.
In the jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Evidence Act, a determination
must be made as to whether the circumstances in which the admission was made
were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely af-
fected, so as to displace the presumptive inadmissibility of the evidence.411 One of
the factors the court must take into account is “any relevant condition or characteris-
tic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education
and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears
to be subject.”412
All jurisdictions have statutory provisions to the effect that a person who for any
reason is unable to understand or communicate adequately in spoken English is not
406 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23K (Austl.) (An “interview friend” includes a parent or
guardian or the child’s lawyer, or, if such a person is not available, a relative or friend, and in
the absence of anyone in those categories, then an independent person.).
407 See id. s 23H.
408 See Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) s 20 (Austl.).
409 See W. AUSTL. POLICE FORCE, supra note 20, s QS-01.02.5.
410 See id.
411 See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 85 (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 85 (Austl.);
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 85 (Austl.); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 85 (Austl.); Evidence Act
2001 (Tas) s 85 (Austl.).
412 See, e.g., Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 85(3)(a).
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to be interviewed until the services of an interpreter or other qualified person are
available.413
In the case of indigenous Australians, there are particular disadvantages and
cultural characteristics that have been recognised by the courts as influencing whether
a suspect has participated in an interview voluntarily or whether it is unfair to allow
the tender of the interview in evidence. They are reflected in a set of guidelines
promulgated in 1976 by Forster J in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in
R v Anunga,414 which came to be known as the Anunga Rules (in a similar vein to
the Judges’ Rules). For some time now, the guidelines have informed the approach
taken by police officers to interviews with indigenous suspects. As Hall J said in
Gibson, the Anunga Rules are not law in Western Australia, but they give a very
good indication of what ordinarily would be regarded as a fair interrogation,415 and
it is no doubt for that reason that they have been adopted in the COP’s Manual.416
In Australia, breaches of the Anunga Rules may be relevant to an assessment of the
voluntariness of confessional evidence by an Aboriginal person.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
The Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) sets special rules for the questioning of
young persons, defined as persons under eighteen years of age.417 Among other
things, section 146 requires that the young person be given certain cautions and that
the young person be given a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel and a
parent or adult relative.418
When it comes to adults, there are no special rules, per se, for those who are vul-
nerable. However, the application of general rules is certainly affected by individual
vulnerabilities. For example, persons impaired by intoxication, lacking English lan-
guage skills, or suffering from cognitive impairments may not understand cautions
given by police at the time of arrest. Where a lack of understanding is, or should be,
apparent to police, police must take additional steps to facilitate comprehension.419
This may involve repeating the cautions, providing further explanation, securing an
interpreter, or other solutions.420 Individual characteristics may also impact the de-
termination of whether statements are voluntary and whether the person’s will was
overborne by questioning tactics.421
413 See, e.g., Criminal Investigations Act 2006 (WA) s 138(2)(d) (Austl.).
414 See (1976) 11 ALR 412, 414–15 (Austl.).
415 See Webb v The Queen (1994) 74 A Crim R 436, 438 (Austl.).
416 See Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240 (4 July 2014) 48 (Austl.).
417 See Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c 1 (Can.).
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ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
PACE Code C specifies “special groups,” which it is the custody officer’s duty
to identify amongst the detained population.422 These include423:
(i) “someone who does not speak or understand English or who has a
hearing or speech impediment”;
(ii) foreign nationals;
(iii) juveniles, defined as “[a]nyone who appears to be under 18 . . . in the
absence of clear evidence that they are older”;424 and
(iv) any “vulnerable” detainee, defined as a person “who, because of a mental
health condition or mental disorder . . . may have difficulty understand-
ing or communicating effectively about the full implications for them
of any procedures and processes . . . does not appear to understand the
significance of what they are told, of questions they are asked or of
their replies . . . [or] appears to be particularly prone to: becoming
confused and unclear about their position; providing unreliable, mis-
leading or incriminating information without knowing or wishing to do
so; accepting or acting on suggestions from others without consciously
knowing or wishing to do so; or readily agreeing to suggestions or
proposals without any protest or question.”425
For the first category of “special group” detainees, provision is made for language
or disability interpreters.426 Foreign nationals, in the second category, must be “in-
formed as soon as practicable about their rights of communication with their High
Commission, Embassy or Consulate” in addition to enjoying the rights afforded to
all suspects held in police custody.427 The most detailed provisions and elaborate
arrangements, however, are reserved for the third and fourth categories of special
detainees, juveniles and the psychologically vulnerable. Paragraph 11.15 of Code
C directs that, subject to limited exceptions, “[a] juvenile or vulnerable person must
not be interviewed regarding their involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal
offence or offences, or asked to provide or sign a written statement under caution
or record of interview, in the absence of the appropriate adult.”428
422 Those suspected of involvement with terrorist activities are subject to their own special
regime. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, c. 27, s. 22 (UK); see also PACE Code H, supra note
205, Part 15.
423 See PACE Code C, supra note 56, 3.12–3.15.
424 Id. at 1.5.
425 Id. at 1.13(d).
426 See id. at 3.12 & Part 13.
427 See id. at 3.12A.
428 Id. at 11.15. An “appropriate adult” is a parent, guardian or carer, local authority social
worker, or “failing these, some other responsible adult aged 18 or over who is not a police of-
ficer” or employee, contractor, or agent of the police. Id. at 1.7.
2021] A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF POLICE INTERROGATION 985
As to a vulnerable suspect’s confession, PACE 1984 eschews automatic exclu-
sion, preserving the admissibility of a suspect’s admissions but subjecting them to
a specially crafted judicial warning. Section 77(1) provides:
Without prejudice to the general duty of the court at a trial on in-
dictment with a jury to direct the jury on any matter on which it
appears to the court appropriate to do so, where at such a trial—
(a) the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially
on a confession by him; and
(b) the court is satisfied—
(i) that he is mentally handicapped; and
(ii) that the confession was not made in the presence of an
independent person,
the court shall warn the jury that there is special need for caution
before convicting the accused in reliance on the confession, and
shall explain that the need arises because of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.429
There is no canonical form of words, but it would usually be wise for the judge
to warn the jury quite explicitly of the “special need for caution” in any case where
section 77 applies.430 Given the scope for excluding potentially unreliable confes-
sions by vulnerable suspects under section 76(2)(b), the practical salience of section
77 warnings may be quite limited.431
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
The Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 contains specific controls on police questioning
of children and young people.432 Such measures include provision of advice and
cautions that are not required to be given to adults.433 Unless the child or young
person is under arrest, these include advice that the child or young person is not
obliged to accompany the enforcement officer to any place for the purpose of being
questioned and that if the child or young person consents to do so, he or she may
withdraw that consent at any time.434 Additionally, young persons are given the right
to consult with and make any statement in the presence of lawyer and a nominated
429 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, s. 77(1) (Eng.).
430 See R v. Campbell [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 522 (CA) 522 (Eng.).
431 See R v. Moss (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 371 (CA) 377 (Eng.); R v. Lamont [1989] Crim.
L. Rev. 813 (CA) (Eng.).
432 See R v. Z [2008] NZCA 246 at [35] (N.Z.) (The Court of Appeal made it clear that
police questioning of young persons is governed by both the Practice Note and the Oranga
Tamariki Act as well as applicable NZBORA rights in sections 23 and 24.).
433 See Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, ss 215–18 (N.Z.).
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and circumstances in which they are put are relevant considerations in light of the
defendant’s disability.
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that categories of unfairness must adapt to
the “circumstances of the particular case at issue.”443 Clearly this allows for consid-
eration of the characteristics of the suspect being questioned.
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
Officers are required to give the same Miranda warnings to all suspects, whether
young, intellectually disabled, or non-native speaking. The Supreme Court made
that clear in Fare v. Michael C., where it said:
We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is
required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his
rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality
approach permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evalua-
tion of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights.444
Research shows that effectively warning juveniles is problematic. Many Miranda
forms contain language beyond the comprehension of juveniles.445 Similar problems
hold true for intellectually disabled persons. Studies consistently show that intellec-
tually disabled persons have “significant deficits in their understanding and appreci-
ation of Miranda warnings.”446 “The validity of waivers entered by persons with
[intellectual disabilities] is suspect for several reasons,” more likely to “respond to
coercion and pressure” and less likely to understand the impact of waiving their rights
compared to persons of average intelligence.447
interviewed the defendant about the alleged offending, the court there held that the defendant’s
admissions were reliable and admissible.
443 R v. Wichman [2015] NZSC 198 at [503] (N.Z.).
444 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). In
Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011), the Court found the warnings provided to the
seventeen-year-old defendant, “which consumed twelve pages of transcript and completely
obfuscated the core precepts of Miranda,” were improper, unclear, and confusing. Id. at 990.
The court observed that the defendant was a juvenile “who had never heard of Miranda.” Id.
at 1002.
445 Kassin et al., supra note 145, at 8.
446 Id. at 20–21 (citing numerous studies).
447 Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Under-
standing and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION
212, 212 (1999).
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The Supreme Court has made clear that interrogation of juveniles calls for “special
care” in evaluating voluntariness.448 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court reiterated
“that events that ‘would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and over-
whelm a lad in his early teens.’”449 As far back as 1967, in the Court’s seminal juve-
nile decision, In re Gault, the Court recognized the special importance to juveniles
of having a friend or parent with them during an interview.450
And yet, it is surprising how few juvenile interrogation cases the Supreme Court
has heard over the past thirty years, especially now that it has recognized the biological
differences between children and adults and when statistics show that juveniles are
at risk for involuntary and false confessions during interrogation. “Numerous high-
profile cases, such as the Central Park Jogger case, have demonstrated the risks of
combining young age, and the attributes that are associated with it (e.g., suggestibility,
heightened obedience to authority, and immature decision-making abilities), and . . .
psychologically oriented interrogation tactics . . . .”451
Persons with intellectual disabilities are similarly at risk and overrepresented in
false confession cases.452 Indeed, when the Supreme Court banned the imposition
of the death penalty on persons with intellectual disabilities, it explicitly pointed to
the risk of false confessions as one reason for its prohibition.453
The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of how non-native speakers
understand Miranda warnings and there is a paucity of case law in the lower courts.
When one federal appeals court was confronted with the issue, it noted:
[A] defendant’s alienage and unfamiliarity with the American
legal system should be [considered]. However, the significance
of these factors will be limited to determining whether a defen-
dant knew and understood the warnings that were read to him.
The fact that a defendant’s alien status may have prevented him
from understanding the full, tactical significance of his decision
to confess will not invalidate his waiver.454
Not surprisingly, however, there is strong evidence that non-native or ESL (English
as a second language) speakers have more difficulty understanding their rights than
448 See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion); J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011).
449 564 U.S. at 272 (quoting Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion)).
450 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
451 Kassin et al., supra note 145, at 19; see also DNA Exonerations in the United States,
supra note 185 (thirty-one percent of false confession cases of those exonerated between
1989 and 2020 involved children under age eighteen).
452 Kassin et al., supra note 145, at 21.
453 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
454 Al-Yousif v. Trani, 779 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting
People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165, 1169–70 (Colo. 2002)).
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native speakers. One study found that most of the participants, all students enrolled
in advanced ESL classes “failed to understand their Miranda rights and displayed
significant disadvantages . . . in comparison to native speakers.”455
B. In reviewing interrogation practices, would courts consider both common law
and constitutional principles?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
The courts in Australia would consider relevant statutory provisions, to which
I have referred earlier, and the common law. There is nothing in the Australian
Constitution or the constitutions of the various states that affects the interpretation
of the statutory provisions concerning the questioning of suspects or the “review”
of interrogation practices by a court in any particular case or generally. In particular,
there is no constitutional foundation for the “right to silence” or any of the other
rights discussed earlier affecting the admissibility of a confession.456 Victoria has a
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities and the Australian Capital Territory
and Queensland have Human Rights Acts, all of which have provisions concerning
a person’s right to liberty and personal security, the right to be treated humanely
when deprived of liberty, and various rights in criminal proceedings.457 Each provides
that a person charged with a criminal offence is entitled without discrimination “not
to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess” but does not deal
with a person’s rights when being interviewed as a suspect.458 In any event, the human
rights legislation does not add to or qualify the statutory and common law require-
ments to which I have referred.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
The court will consider the issues raised by counsel which could include both
common law and constitutional principles.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
The human rights revolution in English criminal procedure459 precipitated by the
Human Rights Act 1998 has effectively constitutionalized fair trial principles in
455 Aneta Pavlenko, Elizabeth Hepford & Scott Jarvis, An Illusion of Understanding: How
Native and Non-native Speakers of English Understand (and Misunderstand) Their Miranda
Rights, 26 INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 181, 200 (2019).
456 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 219 (Austl.).
457 See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ss 21, 22, 25 (Austl.);
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 18, 19, 22 (Austl.); Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ss 29,
30, 32 (Austl.).
458 See, e.g., Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 22(2)(i).
459 Paul Roberts & Jill Hunter, Introduction—The Human Rights Revolution in Criminal
Evidence and Procedure, in CRIMINAL EVIDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REIMAGINING COM-
MON LAW PROCEDURAL TRADITIONS 2 (Paul Roberts & Jill Hunter eds., 2012).
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English law, in the conventional sense of “constitutional” practised in my part of the
common law world.460 There are also certain procedural and evidentiary principles
expressly stated to be constitutional by courts of the highest authority.461
The most pertinent illustration for present purposes is the rule established in A
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) stating that evidence procured
by torture of any person, anywhere in the world, is categorically inadmissible in
English legal proceedings.462 “It trivialises the issue,” declared Lord Bingham, “to
treat it as an argument about the law of evidence. The issue is one of constitutional
principle . . . .”463
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
As noted, in New Zealand, interrogation practices are not specifically controlled
and are largely regulated through the law of evidence. Despite the lack of regulation,
the rule of law means that law enforcement officers themselves are subject to the
law and must follow lawful procedures when undertaking investigation to protect
individual rights as far as is compatible with the public interest.
New Zealand courts have consistently recognised the important role of the ju-
diciary in upholding the rule of law and ensuring the law is not enforced by unlawful
or unjust means:
[I]f the actions of the authorities concerned are of such seriousness
that the proper administration of law by the Courts in dealing with
criminal offences is seriously undermined, then it has a discretion
to act in order to preserve due process and, in the wider public
interest, to ensure the proper conduct of those actions.464
When approaching admissibility challenges in cases of this nature there is on the one
hand the important premise that the judiciary must uphold the rule of law and
prevent the police abusing its powers.465 On the other hand, a significant proportion
of the general public may feel uneasy about the prospect of guilty persons walking
460 Id. at 1.
461 See Paul Roberts, Excluding Evidence as Protecting Constitutional or Human Rights?,
in PRINCIPLES AND VALUES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ANDREW ASHWORTH 171–72 (Lucia Zedner & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2012); Paul Roberts,
Criminal Procedure, the Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Reasoning Under the Human
Rights Act, in JUDICIAL REASONING UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 417 (Helen Fenwick,
Gavin Phillipson & Roger Masterman eds., 2007).
462 [2006] 2 AC 221 (HL) (Eng.).
463 Id. at [51].
464 R v. Hannah HC Auckland T58/83, 15 February 1984 at 10 (N.Z.).
465 Finn Lowery, Abuse of Process: The Need for Structure, 20 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 223,
225 (2014).
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free “on a technicality,” despite the merits of the case against them.466 Whilst an
effective and credible justice system should clearly ensure that guilty people are con-
victed, it must also give effect to the rule of law and the fundamental need to uphold
broader concepts of fairness and justice.467
The Supreme Court has said that it would be “incongruous” if an obviously true
confession was excluded because of the theoretical likelihood that the circumstances
in which it had been made might have affected its reliability or that it would not be
conducive to public confidence in the criminal justice system.468 It is unclear why
this view was taken when conclusive evidence is regularly excluded under statutory
provisions in the name of upholding the rule of law and the need for an effective and
credible system of justice.469 Perhaps greater weight was placed on the public in-
terest in crime detection given that the “Mr Big” technique is generally only de-
ployed in cases of very serious offences such as murder or, as were the facts of that
case, manslaughter. However, it is important that an appropriate balance is struck
even in such cases. “The strength of valued constitutional principles may be best
demonstrated when they are applied in favour of a person whose actions attract
minimal sympathy.”470
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
As noted in the beginning of this Article, this country’s criminal procedure is
entirely governed by the U.S. Constitution. Although the Supreme Court occasion-
ally refers to the common law in reaching its decisions, common law principles do
not govern its result.
466 Id. at 224.
467 See Hamed v. R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [229]–[230] (N.Z.).
It would . . . be a mistake to take the view that the need for an effective
and credible system of justice is solely a counterpoint to the impropri-
ety involved in gaining the evidence. The reference to an effective and
credible system of justice involves not only an immediate focus on the
instant case but also a longer-term and wider focus on the administration
of justice generally.
The admission of improperly obtained evidence must always, to
a greater or lesser extent, tend to undermine the rule of law. By enacting
s 30 Parliament has indicated that in appropriate cases improperly ob-
tained evidence should be admitted, but the longer-term effect of doing
so on an effective and credible system of justice must always be con-
sidered, as well as what may be seen as the desirability of having the
immediate trial take place on the basis of all relevant and reliable
evidence, despite its provenance.
Id.
468 R v. Wichman [2015] NZSC 198 at [83]–[84] (majority); id. at [433] (Glazebrook J).
469 See N.Z. L. Comm’n, supra note 252, s 125.
470 Waaka v. Police CA243/85, 21 July 1987 at 3 (N.Z.).
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V. RECENT TIMES
A. What important legislative developments in this field have occurred?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
The most significant legislative developments in all jurisdictions were those that
introduced (at different times): (a) the statutory frameworks for the rights of arrested
suspects, the obligations of police (and other public officers) in respect of them, and
the consequences of failing to comply with the statutory obligations; (b) the enactment
of a number of the common law principles concerning the admissibility and discre-
tionary exclusion of confessional evidence; and (c) the requirement for audio-visual
recording of interviews, which I will discuss below. In Western Australia, the enact-
ment of the CIA consolidated practices and procedures contained in other legisla-
tion, while also introducing new provisions for the manner in which arrested persons
were to be dealt with.471 A further significant recent development in Western Australia
has been the introduction of regulations (referred to earlier) requiring the ALSWA
to be notified when an Aboriginal person or Torres Strait Islander is detained.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
Our law is mostly driven by judicial pronouncements—at common law and the
charter.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
We have seen that enactment of PACE 1984 was a watershed moment in the
history of custodial interrogation, and of policing powers and criminal investigations
more generally, in England and Wales. The PACE Codes of Practice have subse-
quently undergone almost continuous expansion and refinement. Another important
legislative intervention was the expanded jurisdiction to draw adverse inferences from
“significant silences” introduced by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.472
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
This area is largely regulated by the law of evidence. Since the enactment of the
Evidence Act 2006 there has been little legislative change of relevance to interroga-
tion practices. There have been frequent calls for review.473
471 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 120(2) (Austl.).
472 PACE Code C, supra note 56, 11.4; see also Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994, c. 33, ss. 34–37 (Eng.).
473 The matter is effectively being regulated in an inappropriate, negative, retrospective
and haphazard way through the admissibility of evidence. Apart from anything else, this is only
effective if there is a prosecution. Until there is a comprehensive regime of police questioning,
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In the second review of the Evidence Act, the Law Commission noted that the
general policy of section 30 should be examined given common concerns that the
section is skewed too heavily in favour of admission rather than exclusion.474
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
One of the most important legislative developments has been the requirement
that police interrogations be recorded, discussed below.
A less-well-known but important legislative development was the passage of the
federal Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, which requires any state receiving
federal criminal justice funds to report “the death of any person who is detained,
under arrest, or is in the process of being arrested, [or] is en route to be incarcerated”
in all state, local, and juvenile facilities.475 Despite this law, the Department of Justice
has not tracked in-custody deaths in the United States since 2014.476
It is too soon to tell whether the current movement for police reform will result
in more protective legislation or stricter judicial requirements governing police in-
terrogations. For many decades, commentators have urged courts and legislatures to
institute a variety of reforms, including that defense counsel be present before the initia-
tion of any interrogation,477 that the use of some or all deceptive practices during
interrogations be prohibited,478 and that the length of interrogations be restricted.479
issues will continue to have to be dealt with inappropriately by courts and the Law Commission
when dealing with challenges to the admissibility of evidence. N.Z. L. Comm’n, supra note
252, s 201.
474 Id. at 133. The Law Commission also flagged the possibility of a new Practice Note for
undercover operations following the completion of the review of the Search and Surveillance
regime. Id. at 118–20.
475 Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 13727).
476 42 U.S.C. § 13727 (federal record-keeping); 34 U.S.C. § 60105 (state record-keeping); see
Madison Pearman, Congressman Scott Presses AG Barr to Enforce Law to Record Deaths in
Police Custody, WAVY (June 11, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.wavy.com/washington-dc/con
gressman-scott-presses-ag-barr-to-enforce-law-to-record-deaths-in-police-custody/ [https://
perma.cc/7653-H4LU].
477 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Commentary, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?
A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV.L.REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (urging interrogation
be permitted only in the presence of counsel).
478 See, e.g., Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Re-
considering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 791,
794–95 (2006) (good policy to prohibit deception by law enforcement “in a criminal justice
system expressly designed to elicit the truth about a crime”); Welsh S. White, False Confessions
and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 105, 148 (1997) (“[M]isrepresentations designed to convince the suspect that forensic evi-
dence establishes his guilt should be prohibited.”).
479 White, supra note 478, at 143–44.
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B. Are there any groundbreaking court decisions in the area worthy of note?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
Tofilau, which I discussed in the context of undercover operations, was a
significant development in clarifying the application of the rules concerning volun-
tariness to an undercover operation that in many respects resembled an interview of
the accused.480
Another decision of note is X7 v Australian Crime Commission.481 X7 dealt with
the intersection between criminal proceedings and compulsory examinations before
powerful investigative bodies such as the Australian Crime Commission. The appellant
was arrested and charged with three indictable offences under the Criminal Code
(Cth). The Australia Crime Commission Act 2002 (ACC Act) provided that an ex-
aminer appointed under that Act could summon a person to appear at an examination
to give evidence.482 It further provided that a person appearing at an examination
should not refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she was required to answer
by the examiner and that to do so constituted an indictable offence.
At the examination, the appellant was asked and answered questions concerning
the subject matter of the offences with which he had been charged. Following an
adjournment, he declined to answer further questions on those matters. He was in-
formed by the examiner that he would be charged with failing to answer a question
that he was required to answer. A direction was given under section 25A(9) that
prosecutors and police officers associated with the prosecution of the offences with
which the appellant had been charged were not entitled to receive a copy of the
evidence given by him at the examination.483
A majority of the High Court held that the ACC Act did not authorise an examiner
to require a person charged with a Commonwealth indictable offence to answer ques-
tions about the subject matter of the charged offence.484 The Court’s view was that this
was contrary to the established system of law.485 For an alteration of that kind to be
made by statute, it must be made clearly by express words or necessary intendment,
which they did not find to be the case in relation to the ACC Act.486 Even if the evi-
dence was kept secret, the accused’s rights at trial would be fundamentally altered.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
I have already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Hart, one of the top groundbreaking decisions of late in Canada.487
480 See supra text accompanying note 365.
481 (2013) 248 CLR 92 (Austl.).
482 Australia Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 28(1) (Austl.).
483 X7, 248 CLR at 106.
484 Id. at 127.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 140–41.
487 See supra notes 374–76 and accompanying text.
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Historically, another landmark decision was that in R. v. Brydges.488 In that case,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that all detainees must be told, as part of the in-
formation given upon arrest or detention, that there is a 1-800 number through which
they can access free legal advice from duty counsel.489 After Brydges was decided,
all provinces implemented a twenty-four-hour duty counsel system to offer this
advice to persons detained or arrested. This development ensured that all persons
could obtain the legal advice they needed at the time of arrest, whether or not they
could afford to retain a lawyer.
A more recent trilogy of cases from the Supreme Court of Canada narrowed the
scope of the section 10(b) right: R. v. Sinclair; R. v. Willier; R. v. McCrimmon.490 In
those cases, the majority ruled that, once a detainee has been given a reasonable op-
portunity to exercise the right to counsel, he or she will not be given another oppor-
tunity to speak to a lawyer, unless there is a material change of circumstance.491 The
Court was fundamentally concerned with where the balance of power should lie in
the interrogation room.492 The majority reasoned that because suspects are an im-
portant source of evidence, they should not be empowered to obstruct questioning
by asking for a lawyer at strategic moments.493 The Court also rejected the idea that a
detainee has the right to have a lawyer present during questioning.494 While perhaps
not “groundbreaking” in the traditional sense, these decisions have impacted the
scope of the rights triggered by detention or arrest.
We can expect more important decisions in the area. The evidentiary power of
a confession is profound. Many laypersons find it hard to believe that someone would
confess to a crime that they did not commit. Yet, we know that it does happen for
a variety of reasons relating to the human condition. Is there a way to counter the
“common sense” notion that people do not falsely confess? It is here that expert
evidence may have a role to play. Expert evidence that speaks in general terms about
the phenomenon, without reference to the specific facts of the case, could provide
important context for a jury presented with this issue. Canadian courts have, to date,
been less than receptive to this type of evidence.495 However, given our experience
with false confessions and wrongful convictions, the time may have come for a more
488 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.).
489 Id. at 203, 211.
490 See generally R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (Can.); R. v. Willier,
2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429 (Can.); R. v. McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36, [2010] 2 S.C.R.
402 (Can.).
491 Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, para. 2, 2 S.C.R. at 311; Willier, 2010 SCC 37, para. 42, 2
S.C.R. at 430; McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36, para. 3, 2 S.C.R. at 403.
492 Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, para. 26, 2 S.C.R. at 313.
493 Id. paras. 195–96.
494 Id. para. 42.
495 See, e.g., R. v. Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50, para. 66, [2007] 84 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344, para. 69, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1705 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
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permissive approach to this evidence. To educate juries on this phenomenon is to
give them the tools that they may need to reach a fair and informed verdict.
ENGLAND AND WALES, PROFESSOR ROBERTS:
Authoritative judicial interpretations and key precedent cases have been men-
tioned throughout the foregoing discussion. The need to ensure that English criminal
procedure law is fully compatible with ECHR article 6 has generated extensive
litigation, whilst particular issues—notably, objections to proactive policing methods
as “entrapment” and the minutiae of judicial directions on adverse inferences from
silence—spawn prodigious appellate rulings.
NEW ZEALAND, HON. JUDGE HARVEY:
In the absence of any statutory regime regulating interrogation, principles in the
senior court authorities outlined above provide for much of the law and its develop-
ment in this area. The recent Court of Appeal case of Lyttle v. R496 illustrates how
a criminal trial is not the place to make general rulings about the legitimacy of
methods of investigation and that comprehensive review would be a much more
appropriate course.497
In Lyttle, the defendant was charged with murder following a “Mr Big” opera-
tion. The prosecution proposed to adduce the admissions the defendant had made
to the undercover officers. The defence wished to call evidence attacking the value
of that evidence. One proposed witness was an American professor of law and
psychology who would testify as to the frequency and misleading nature of false
confessions, including cases where suspects who had confessed to crimes had been
exonerated by DNA evidence.498 The witness would identify matters which were
accepted as leading to false confessions and then review the evidence to see whether
those factors applied in the case at hand. The other proposed witness was a Canadian
psychologist who would analyse the psychological factors in “Mr Big” operations
and identify any relevant factors at play in that case.499
The trial judge determined that the risks of false confessions were self-evident
and that the expert witnesses would not be of substantial help to the jury. On appeal
to the Court of Appeal, the defence argued that the whole point of “Mr Big” opera-
tions was psychological pressure and that Mr. Lyttle had been particularly vulnera-
ble to such pressure as he had a drinking problem, was isolated, and in financial
difficulty.500 It was highlighted that some of what he had said was proven not to be
true. It was argued that false confessions are more common and more convincing
496 [2019] NZCA 226 at [21]–[23] (N.Z.).
497 See N.Z. L. Comm’n, supra note 252, s 284.
498 Lyttle, [2019] NZCA 226 at [23].
499 Id. at [21], [24].
500 Id. at [35].
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than is generally appreciated. The expert evidence, it was argued, was required to
remedy misconceptions that the jury might hold.
The Court of Appeal was of the view that the possibility of false confession
could be dealt with by judicial direction.501 Otherwise, the evidence was a general-
ised attack on the “Mr Big” technique which had been held not to be unlawful in
principle by the Supreme Court.502 The Court of Appeal noted that the Supreme
Court had stated that case by case evaluation would be required and that a confes-
sion induced by promises would be excluded.503
The Court of Appeal’s response shows that clearly a trial will always turn on the
particular facts of the case and the information before the court will be limited to
that pertaining to the issues in the particular case and, of course, by budgetary
factors.504 Examination of investigative methods should be by a thorough, prospec-
tive review of the regulation of police questioning.
UNITED STATES, MS. BROOK:
Two groups of groundbreaking decisions come to mind. First, since 2005, the
Supreme Court has issued four significant decisions recognizing that “children are
constitutionally different” than adults, more vulnerable with brains that are still
developing.505 These decisions, which have generated a number of articles and some
case law, have already caused law enforcement to modify the techniques it uses
when interrogating children.506
The other group of groundbreaking decisions consists of the thirteen consent
decrees entered into between the Department of Justice and local governments,
which have been approved by court order. These decrees contain language requiring
a specified amount of additional training in proper interrogation techniques.507 For
instance, the Chicago Consent Decree separately identifies unique requirements for
the interrogation of juveniles, an area where commentators believe training is es-
pecially important.508
501 Id. at [39].
502 Id. at [41].
503 Id.
504 N.Z. L. Comm’n, supra note 252, s 285.
505 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for persons
under eighteen); see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory
life without parole for persons under eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69
(2010) (prohibiting life without parole for persons under eighteen not convicted of murder);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 (2016) (applying Miller retroactively).
506 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question
Kids, 23 CORNELL J.L.&PUB.POL’Y 395, 396–97 (2013); supra note 444 and accompanying
text (discussing Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011)).
507 See, e.g., Consent Decree at 154–55, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).
508 Id. at 9; see Kassin et al., supra note 145, at 31.
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C. Recorded interrogations are becoming much more common. Do/should
legislation or court rules require interrogations to be recorded? Should they be
recorded for all offenses or only for some? What is/should the sanction be for
failing to record interrogations when required?
AUSTRALIA, HON. JUSTICE FIANNACA:
In Australia, police interviews with suspects in cases involving serious offences
are almost invariably recorded on video (previously on analogue tape, now on digital
media). That is mandated by statutory provisions in all jurisdictions.509 In most jurisdic-
tions, this development was the result of a number of cases in which interviews that
had been typed or written, some signed by the accused and others not, were challenged
on the basis that the admissions were not made or that the police had extracted the
admissions by oppressive methods or inducements. In some cases, the admissions
were excluded from evidence either at first instance or on appeal. In others, while
the confessions were not excluded, the courts made it clear that the failure to use
video recording facilities to record interviews was fraught.510
In broad terms, the statutory provisions requiring video recording of interviews
with suspects in Australia make the admissibility of confessions or admissions
dependent upon there being a video recording of the same, subject to certain excep-
tions. There are differences between the jurisdictions as to whether the provisions
apply to all offences or a particular category of offences. Other differences concern
the stage at which the provisions apply in the interaction between the police (or
other relevant public officers) and the suspect and the ability to rely on written
records of interview in some jurisdictions when it is not reasonably practicable to
electronically record the confession or admission, although there is a need to record
a reading of the written record. A detailed comparison may be found elsewhere.511
The statutory provision in Western Australia, section 118 of the CIA, applies to “an
admission made by a suspect to a police officer or a [Corruption and Crime Commis-
sion] officer, whether the admission is by spoken words or by acts or otherwise.”512
509 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23V (Austl.); Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 281(2)
(Austl.); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464H (Austl.); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act
2000 (Qld) s 436 (Austl.); Criminal Investigations Act 2006 (WA) s 118 (Austl.); Summary
Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74C–74G (Austl.); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 85A (Austl.); Police
Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 142 (Austl.). Section 23V of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
applies in the Australian Capital Territory in relation to certain offences against the law of
that territory. See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23A(6) (Austl.); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 187(3)
(Austl.); see also Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 86 (Austl.).
510 See, e.g., Kelly v The Queen [1994] WASC 594 (27 October 1994) 19 (Austl.); Sell v
The Queen [1995] WASC 330 (22 June 1995) 21 (Austl.). In McKinney v The Queen (1991)
171 CLR 468, 484 (Austl.), the High Court held that a warning would need to be given to the
jury of the danger of conviction on the basis of disputed confessional statement made while
the accused was in custody and not corroborated.
511 See DYSON HEYDON, CROSS ON EVIDENCE [33775] (12th ed. 2019).
512 The section distinguishes between the approach in respect of a child, being a person
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The requirement for an audio-visual recording applies only if the admission is
made after there were reasonable grounds to suspect the person had committed an
offence.513 However, the requirement is not confined to admissions made during a
formal interview.514 The provision properly places the onus on the prosecution to
establish why an admission should be received if it is not video recorded—for instance,
that the accused did not give consent or there is a reasonable excuse for the absence
of a video recording.515 The standard of proof is consistent with the standard borne
by the prosecution in establishing voluntariness.516 Finally, the discretionary power
in section 155 to admit the evidence if the court is satisfied that “the desirability of
admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting the evidence.”517
In my opinion, police interviews with suspects should be video recorded to
safeguard the rights of an accused and the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Of course, if the suspect does not consent to the recording being made, police should
not be deterred from proceeding with an interview for the purpose of being able to
pursue lines of inquiry and obtain an admission in written form. That is particularly
so in the case of very serious offences. In my view, the statutory provisions in all of
the Australian jurisdictions strike the right balance in enabling admissions to be
received into evidence if there is a reasonable excuse why it is not contained in an
audio-visual recording. Furthermore, conferring discretion on the court enables the
interests of justice, informed by a long line of common law authorities, to ultimately
determine whether the evidence should be admitted.
As to whether the requirement should be for all offences, that is a matter of
resourcing, which affects policy decisions of the kind that have resulted in a provi-
sion like section 118 of the CIA being limited to indictable offences that cannot be
dealt with summarily (in the case of an adult). Such offences are at the more serious
end of the spectrum. Not all jurisdictions have such a limitation.
CANADA, HON. JUSTICE POMERANCE:
We are living in an age where virtually any member of the public can record and
upload an event onto social media within moments. Many, if not most individuals
carry phones that operate as video cameras.518 Against this backdrop, it is difficult
who is under the age of eighteen years, and an adult, in that in the case of an adult suspect, the
section applies only if the person is charged with an indictable offence that cannot be dealt with
by a court of summary jurisdiction, whereas in the case of a child, it applies if the person is
charged with an indictable offence, irrespective of whether it can be dealt with summarily.
Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 118(2) (Austl.).




517 Id. s 155(2).
518 See S. O’Dea, Number of Smartphone Users in Canada from 2018 to 2024 (in Millions)*,
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in England and Wales on nationwide statutory standards and guidelines is striking.
Criminal justice professionals in the United States, by contrast, focus almost entirely
on review under the national Constitution.
Lawmakers and judges in Canada and New Zealand have serious concerns as
to the interrogation process in connection with undercover operations. While their
Australian counterparts have also expressed concerns, they appear to have a prefer-
ence for applying general common law principles on a case-by-case basis, rather
than formulating specific rules or guidelines for particular scenarios.
With all the commentators here, there is a clear and united view that technology
is changing the entire police interrogation process. Whether developed by statute,
judicial rulings, or common practice, cameras and recording devices are certainly
changing the way in which law enforcement personnel conduct their investigations
of individual suspects.
